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REDIRECTING DIRECT DEMOCRACY:
NON-ESSENTIAL SPENDING
AS POLITICAL SPEECH
STEPHANIE R. HOFFER

*

Direct voting on taxes and spending have created an imbalance
between direct democracy and representative democracy at local levels of
government. Overreach by voters, unable to engage in debate and
compromise, can force representatives into defensive and suboptimal
decision-making, resulting in either underproduction or overproduction
of certain public goods. As a consequence, some scholars have called for
extreme limitation, or even abolition, of direct democracy in tax and
spending decisions. This need not be the solution. Empirical studies of
human behavior suggest that channeling direct democratic decisionmaking would produce results superior to those of limitation or abolition.
Building a bridge between representative and direct democratic processes,
even with regard to relatively inconsequential subject matters, would
provide representative government with valuable information about
constituent attitudes and preferences while fostering constituent
cooperation in the provision of public goods. Specifically, this Article
proposes preservation of existing direct democratic mechanisms while
permitting constituents to opt out of payments for particular non-essential
public goods chosen by the representative government on the basis of
established criteria. Such a system would lessen the likelihood of overt
tax revolt by giving a voice to all constituents, even those who decline to
proactively engage in political speech, satisfying libertarian preferences of
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I. INTRODUCTION
The provision of essential public goods such as roads, schools, and
emergency services is unquestionably within the authority of local
1
governments. The public mandate for these goods is widely recognized,
and their basic availability at the local level is non-negotiable. It is not
surprising, then, that elected representatives raise revenue for essential
goods through mandatory, broad-based taxes such as sales, income, and
2
real property taxes. Provision of these goods is unlikely to induce
constituent revolt because constituents’ aggregate preferences for them
are likely to be closely aligned with elected representatives’ preferences,
if not in quality, then at least in kind. The same alignment may not hold
true, however, for the provision of non-essential public goods, which are
nonetheless frequently financed with mandatory broad-based taxes.
Furthermore, using revenue from broad-based taxes to provide these
1. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 19 (6th ed. 2006) (describing various forms of local government and noting
that municipalities “dominate local government expenditure on highways, police and fire
protection, parking, libraries, housing and urban redevelopment, and sewerage and
sanitation”).
2. See id. at 295, 337, 349, 363 (describing property taxes, income taxes, use charges, sales
taxes, and lotteries as ways in which municipalities raise revenue).
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goods may increase the potential for constituent revolt through voter
enactment of limitations on government tax and spending powers.
Consequently, a representative government’s choice to provide nonessential public goods creates an opportunity to address the sometimes
volatile relationship between those governments and their constituents.
Addressing this relationship is both necessary and timely in light of
state and local revenue shortfalls arising in the wake of the Great
3
Recession. Beginning with the recession of the 1970s and continuing
through today, direct voting on taxes and spending has created an
imbalance between direct democracy and representative democracy at
the local level. Overreach by voters, unable to engage in debate and
compromise, can force representatives into defensive and suboptimal
decision-making, resulting in either underproduction or overproduction
of certain public goods. As a consequence, some scholars have called
for extreme limitation, or even abolition, of direct democracy in tax and
4
spending decisions. This need not be the solution. Empirical studies of
human behavior suggest that channeling direct democratic decisionmaking would produce results superior to those of limitation or
5
abolition.
Building a bridge between representative and direct
democratic processes, even with regard to relatively inconsequential
matters, would generate information about constituent preferences
while fostering constituent cooperation in the provision of public goods.
This Article proposes preservation of existing direct democratic
mechanisms while permitting constituents to opt out of payments for
particular non-essential public goods chosen by the representative
government. Doing so would lessen the likelihood of direct democratic
revolt by giving voice to all constituents, even those who decline to
proactively engage in political speech. In addition, it would foster
demonstrated cooperation among some constituents, a condition that
6
behavioral science has shown to be contagious.
In support of this proposal, Part II of the Article will describe the

3. See Michael Booth, Loss of City Services: Springs Lays Bare Its Budget Woes in
Painful Cuts, DENVER POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at 1A (discussing local government cuts to basic
services due to revenue shortfalls); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., America Goes Dark, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2010, at A19 (same).
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See infra Parts II.D, V.E.
6. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 616 (2000) [hereinafter Kahan, Gentle Nudges].
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current imbalance between direct and representative democratic
7
decision-making on tax and spending issues by local government.
Specifically, it will argue that current forms of democratic decisionmaking should be preserved as an important check on representative
government, but that constituents’ impulse to overreach through the use
of existing direct democratic mechanisms could be more constructively
channeled through increased interaction between the representative and
direct democratic processes. Part III will argue that local governments
could accomplish this goal by selecting certain recurring non-capital,
non-essential expenses and allowing constituents to opt out of paying
their share. This new form of direct democracy could take as its starting
point an opt-out tax employed by religious congregations in Germany,
which allows constituents to exit on a rolling basis rather than requiring
8
a one-time vote. An opt-out is preferable to an opt-in, I argue, because
in the absence of bureaucratic barriers, constituents who are unable to
overcome stickiness of the default option generally will not have strong
preferences about the expenses up for debate. This lack of strong
preferences justifies a presumption in favor of the representative
government. For that reason, an opt-out is preferable to an opt-in. In
Part IV, the Article identifies potential problems and proposes
structural solutions for them, focusing particularly on the criticism that
proportional decision-making by the populace produces results that are
not consonant with public choice. Part V describes benefits arising from
the model, including increased consensus among constituents, and Part
VI concludes this Article.
II. IMBALANCE IN DIRECT AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
TAXES
A. Why Should We Care About Decisions Made by Local Governments?
Although decision-making by one locality may seem to have little
7. In this context, “direct democracy” refers to political decision-making processes, such
as the ballot initiative and the referendum, that are used by constituents to directly affect
outcomes. Dale A. Oesterle, Ballot Measures: Initiatives and Referendums, ELECTION
LAW @ MORITZ (Nov. 10, 2004), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part7/elections_
direct02.html. In contrast, as used in this Article, “representative democracy” refers to
governance by elected representatives. See id.
8. Stephanie R. Hoffer, Caesar as God’s Banker: Using Germany’s Church Tax as an
Example of Non-Geographically Bounded Taxing Jurisdiction, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 595, 604–06 (2010).
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effect on the country as a whole, and therefore may seem to be of little
consequence, the aggregate impact of local governments is impressive.
The political magnitude of money raised, borrowed, and spent by local
governments cannot be overstated. Nonetheless, the question of
whether and how representative governments should share their
decision-making power with constituents has not yet been fully
9
answered. Although the so-called tax revolt of the 1970s produced a
rich literature on the propriety of California’s tax-limiting Proposition
13 and similar pronouncements, scholars of direct democracy and taxes
10
have primarily focused on ballot-box voting by constituents. A second
form of direct democracy—proportionate decision-making—has
11
generated very little discussion. I seek to fill this gap by introducing a
new element to the direct democracy tax debate: an opt-out system of
funding for selected non-essential public goods that will allow
constituents to collaborate with the representative government and
engage in political speech through proportionate decision-making.
Before discussing the proposal in earnest, it is useful to consider
some general information about local governments and their spending
habits. The United States has a jaw-dropping array of local government
institutions. Counties, cities, school districts, fire departments, utilities,
and countless other special purpose districts are permitted to levy taxes
12
and issue bonds. The 2002 census counted more than eighty-seven

9. Although many articles address the question of direct democratic decision-making,
few have squarely addressed the great potential for interrelationship between the direct
democratic process and the representative process. For a useful foray into this area, see Kirk
J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2001).
10. See ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT, HOW PROPERTY
TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 14 (2008) (noting that popular referendum was a
watershed moment in tax politics); Stark, supra note 9, at 192 n.7 (“Prop 13 has spawned an
enormous literature.”). For two examples of this, see William A. Fischel, Did John Serrano
Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloff’s “Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did
Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?,” 51 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2004); and Kirk Stark &
Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?, 50
UCLA L. REV. 801 (2003).
11. For two articles discussing proportional tax voting, see Saul Levmore, Taxes as
Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387 (1998); and Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without
Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555 (2002).
12. For instance, in addition to counties and municipalities, the State of New York has
public authorities for parks, highways, bridges, tunnels, markets, public utilities, ports,
parking, science and technology, health care, and local government assistance. See N.Y. PUB.
AUTH. LAW §§ 150–471, 525–734, 825–893, 1000–1348, 1350–1399, 1400–1621, 3001–3040,
3100–3109 (Consol. 2010). And this does not include the usual plethora of fire, water, and
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13

thousand such entities. These entities spent in excess of $2.3 trillion in
14
2004, which was approximately 19% of the U.S. GDP. The enormity of
this expense justifies a deeper inquiry into the direct and representative
democratic processes through which localities raise and spend revenue.
This task is made difficult by the practically non-existent definition of
“local government” and the variety of entities that this loose term
encompasses. I readily acknowledge that not all local government
entities can, or should, adopt an opt-out system to finance certain non15
essential goods; however, the sheer enormity of the task makes it
impossible to address each form of entity individually. Consequently, I
will use the term “local government” to refer to those entities with
broadly defined general responsibilities, such as municipalities and
counties.
Local governments usually raise revenue through a combination of
16
taxation, fee-for-use charges, and borrowing.
Taxes are generally
thought of as costs imposed on all taxpayers within a local government’s
17
jurisdiction for purposes of covering the government’s expenses. They
are imposed without regard to the particular benefit received by any
individual payor, and instead are regarded as contributions to the
18
general welfare of all. Taxes may take a variety of forms, but property
19
and sales taxes are most common at the local level. In addition, a few
20
states allow local governments to levy income taxes.
Local
school districts that work side by side with most municipalities. See MANDELKER ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 17–22 (describing a variety of local, non-municipal government entities).
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 261 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2008/2008edition.html; see also Akash Deep &
Robert Lawrence, Stabilizing State and Local Budgets: A Proposal for Tax-Base Insurance 7
(The
Hamilton
Project
Discussion
Paper
No.
2008-1),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/06_tax_base_lawrence/06_tax_base_la
wrence.pdf.
14. See Deep & Lawrence, supra note 13, at 6.
15. For instance, it is not clear that government entities with narrowly defined missions
will have non-essential expenses eligible for inclusion in the proposed funding structure.
Furthermore, use of the structure by a multitude of entities with overlapping geographical
jurisdictions may result both in constituent confusion and voter fatigue.
16. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 256–57 (describing local finance as a
combination of taxes and borrowing).
17. Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For”
Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 379 (2004).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 379–80.
20. Id. at 380. For instance, as your author is painfully aware, both Columbus, Ohio, and
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governments may also charge fees or special assessments for specific
21
benefits provided to individual constituents. For example, bus fare,
dog licenses, and charges for water, sewer, and garbage disposal are all
revenue generating activities that are not thought to be taxes but which
are, nonetheless, an increasingly important component of local public
22
finance.
Most scholars who study public finance at the local level credit a rise
of fee usage by local governments to state restrictions on the local taxing
23
power. Over the past three decades, state statutory and constitutional
restrictions on local tax and spending decisions have become more
commonplace and, interestingly, many such provisions found their
24
genesis in the direct democratic process itself. California’s Proposition
25
13 is a generally acknowledged progenitor of these measures, and in
light of my recommendation that states permit local governments to use
direct democracy in a proportional manner, a brief discussion of its
passage and broader effect is warranted. The subject has been
extensively covered elsewhere, so this overview will not be
26
comprehensive. Rather, it is intended to highlight one way in which
direct democracy comes to the fore in tax and spending decisions:
through the voter initiative process.
Popularly hailed as the beginning of a nationwide property tax
revolt, California’s Proposition 13 is one of the most discussed direct
27
democratic tax decisions of the past century.
As such, it is
New York City, New York, have income taxes at the local level.
21. Id. at 381.
22. Id. Prevented by voters from raising taxes, local governments have made increasing
use of fees and assessments, which has given rise to criticism. Professor Laurie Reynolds
observes that local governments’ greater reliance on fees may “have a privatizing effect on
government services.” Id. at 380; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1241, 1244 (2009) (noting that limiting the taxing power of home-rule cities forces
them to rely on other instruments of funding, which “has a more subtle and potentially more
notorious consequence of instantiating a particularly limited view of the proper role of
cities”).
23. See Gillette, supra note 22, at 1253 (stating that studies claim tax caps shift local
government toward greater use of fees); Reynolds, supra note 17, at 392–93 (noting local
governments increasingly resort to fees because fees are not subject to tax caps).
24. See Stark, supra note 9, at 192–93.
25. See id. at 192; Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and
Local Fiscal Policy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property
Tax as a Case in Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 511, 532 (2002).
26. Stark, supra note 9, at 192 n.7 (“Prop 13 has spawned an enormous literature.”).
27. See MARTIN, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that popular referendum was a watershed
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unquestionably relevant to the appropriate role of direct democratic
processes in tax decision-making. Rather than serve as a model for the
process, I assert that Proposition 13 and its progeny created an
imbalance between direct and representative democracy that may force
local representatives to make suboptimal decisions, either underfunding
necessary public goods, or seeking to supply these goods through
28
accounting subterfuge. I further argue that correcting the balance of
direct and representative democracy could prevent future constituent
29
overreach through the direct democratic process.
The question is
particularly timely, with representative governments and constituents
currently in tension with one another as both groups seek to recover
30
from ongoing financial strain.
The state constitutional amendment approved by Proposition 13,
which specifies that local property tax rates must “not exceed One
percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property,” resulted from
citizens’ dissatisfaction with modernization of California’s antiquated
31
property tax regime. In the years immediately preceding Proposition
13, California and other states began to eradicate a practice called
32
fractional assessment. Although not explicitly permitted by law, local
tax assessors were known to assess properties at a fraction of their true
33
value. Because property taxes are the product of the local tax rate and
property value, fractional assessment reduced the tax liability of those
34
whose property was undervalued by an assessor.
As one might
imagine, this practice placed an undue amount of discretion in the hands

moment in tax politics); Robinson, supra note 25, at 533 (“Proposition 13’s passage ignited a
conflagration.”); Stark, supra note 9, at 192 n.7 (“Prop 13 has spawned an enormous
literature.”).
28. For instance, localities that are subject to capital spending restrictions may seek to
provide public goods by leasing them rather than actually purchasing them, circumventing the
capital spending restriction.
29. Or, at the very least, it could stem constituent discontent arising from the inability to
selectively locate, a la Tiebout, in a jurisdiction where the level of public goods matches
constituents’ preferences. For a brief discussion of Tiebout sorting, see infra Part V.D.
30. See Michael Cooper, More Gloom Lies Ahead for Cities, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2011, at A10 (discussing that cities must cut spending as a result of lower property
tax revenues and less aid from states).
31. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA §§ 1–7; see also MARTIN, supra note 10, at 10–15.
32. MARTIN, supra note 10, at 12; see also Robinson, supra note 25, at 523–25 (discussing
how fairer assessment increased taxes which, in turn, increased taxpayer complaints).
33. See MARTIN, supra note 10, at 7.
34. Id. at 6–15.
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of assessors, who were generally elected officials. On the tax books,
then, influential families and campaign contributors may have appeared
to reside in a modest home, while those with less social or economic
36
clout notionally lived large.
According to at least one scholar,
fractional assessment of property values was the single largest tax
subsidy of the post-war era—ten times greater than the home mortgage
37
interest deduction.
As a matter of equity, fractional assessment was a disaster, and the
push for social justice in the 1960s eventually resulted in sweeping
38
amendments to the system. California created a central administration
with standardized assessment procedures, and as a consequence, the
39
property values used to calculate local taxes rose precipitously.
Although standardization furthered fairness by equalizing the taxation
of similarly situated property holders within a locality, it also shocked
40
the citizenry, who responded in an unprecedented way. Studies have
shown that Proposition 13 protestors came from all walks of life and
41
from both sides of the political aisle. The Proposition 13 tax protest
was different from conservative anti-tax movements today, mainly
42
because it was a bipartisan uprising.
35. Id. at 7.
36. Id. at 12–13.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Id. at 12–13. Prior to the amendment, most people paid tax on only a portion of the
value of their property, which provided insulation for market shocks. This was particularly
important in California, where wartime and postwar construction sent property values
skyward. Id.
40. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 530 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court
“characterized Proposition 13 as . . . possibly ‘improvident’” (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 17 (1992)); Stark, supra note 9, at 199 (explaining that Proposition 13 was “radical” in
nature, and it is “not surprising that almost everyone writing about Proposition 13 has
described it as a ‘revolt’”).
41. See MARTIN, supra note 10, at 3.
42. See id. Today’s movement is more one-sided. See Brian Montopoli, Tea Party
Supporters: Who They Are and What They Believe, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20002529-503544.html. A New York Times and
CBS news poll showed that among Tea Party supporters 54% considered themselves
Republicans, but 66% stated that they always or usually voted Republican, while 73% of Tea
Party backers consider their political philosophy to be somewhat or very conservative. Id.;
CNN Polling Ctr., Who Are the Tea Party Activists, CNN OPINION RES. CORP. (Feb. 17,
2010), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/02/17/rel4b.pdf (showing polling data
explaining that more than three fourths of tea party activists consider themselves
conservatives, and 87% would vote for Republican candidates in their own district if there
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Scholars almost universally agree that Proposition 13 was the first
domino to fall in citizens’ direct democratic bid to seize control of local
43
finance. Immediately afterward, a wave of states voted on tax and
44
spending limits in what commentators have termed “tax revolts.” As a
result, a number of state constitutions now contain express limitations
45
on the tax and spending powers of local governments. Professor Stark
has noted that these restrictions tend to fall into two broad categories:
(1) direct measures that limit the tax rate, tax base, or spending
decisions, and (2) procedural measures such as those that require a
popular vote or supermajority approval requirements for new taxes or
46
increased rates.
Although the efficacy and advisability of direct democratic tax and
spending restrictions necessarily vary on the basis of local government
and constituent composition, the eventual scholarly consensus has been
47
qualified disapproval.
Rather than join those who approve or
disapprove of the voter-imposed limitations, I instead suggest that
guiding direct democratic tax decision-making is a better solution than
either relying on it or undermining it. This is because, with guidance,
voter involvement can create a constructive environment that provides
the representative government with information on voter preferences
48
and fosters constituent cooperation in the provision of public goods.
B. What Is Wrong with Direct Democratic Tax Restrictions?
To best understand how to usefully employ direct democratic
decision-making in the local tax arena, we must understand both the
flaws that it seeks to correct and the structural limitations imposed by its
were no Tea Party-endorsed candidate).
43. For example, see Robinson, supra note 25, at 532 (“Proposition 13 set off a chain
reaction.”).
44. Stark, supra note 9, at 191–92 (noting that Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
and Washington all have voted in favor of constitutional amendments requiring local
governments to seek approval through popular vote on new and increased taxes); see also
Robinson, supra note 25, at 532–33.
45. See Stark, supra note 9, at 191–92.
46. Id. at 193.
47. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252–53 (noting that while constraints on the
taxing power can, in theory, be corrective, in reality they are “a rather blunt instrument that
can have perverse effects”); Robinson, supra note 25, at 518 (arguing that “unmonitored
ballot box fiscal activity has gone too far,” and that such restrictions have a “potentially
crippling effect” on the ability of local government to organize its finances).
48. See infra Part III.
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current form. One means of doing so is to look more closely at the
narrative of Proposition 13 to the extent that it serves as a
representative example. It is clear that Proposition 13 was a direct voter
response to bad decisions made by local governments.
Local
governments made up of elected officials failed to effectively limit the
discretion wielded by tax assessors, who were also elected officials. This
resulted not only in patronage but also in generally regressive effective
49
rates of property taxation. Also, when this problem was corrected
through state centralization, local governments made up of elected
officials failed to adjust property tax rates downward in response to an
50
increase in assessed property values.
Although the first of these mistakes was, perhaps, openly and
notoriously a part of the representative democratic process, the second,
which led to the tax revolt, was seemingly a malfunction of the same
process. In other words, elected officials’ sudden insistence on
collecting the full rate of property tax on the full value of constituents’
homes and businesses was not anticipated by the constituents who voted
51
for the decision-making representatives. Rather, it was outside the
scope of predictable local government action. Put otherwise, the actions
of elected officials were not, speaking colloquially, representative of
constituents’ preferences, nor were they the result of a deliberative
debate that weighed constituents’ preferences in a politically created
balance. State intervention, then, contributed to a failure of the local
representative process. In a libertarian-leaning society, it is natural that
constituents responded to tone-deaf representative governments by
reiterating their preferences directly, outside of the representative
52
process.
A lack of symmetry between constituents’ preferences and the actual
outcomes produced by representative democracy is not necessarily
49. See MARTIN, supra note 10, at 6–15.
50. See id. at 12–14.
51. See id.
52. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV.
434, 435–36 (1998) (noting that direct democracy causes citizens to believe that they have a
voice in governance); Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative:
Procedures that Do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 48 (1995) (arguing that ballot
initiative provides a political outlet for citizens who are dissatisfied with their representative
government); Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
903, 905 (2006) (stating that direct democracy persists because representative government is
“often too remote from the people”).
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troubling. In fact, the same result is common at all levels of government
53
in the United States.
Furthermore, it is not troubling that
representative governments produce unexpected outcomes under
unexpected circumstances. However, a radical deviation from the
expected course of governance, such as California local governments’
failure to adjust tax rates in response to a drastic state-mandated
widening of the tax base, may fall beyond the scope of actions and
omissions implicitly approved by constituents. It is possible to claim
that Proposition 13 arose as a direct result of constituents’ perception
that local governments were grabbing assets in a way that exceeded not
the formal, but the implicit scope of representatives’ authority. In
response, voters made the scope of their implicit grant of authority
explicit through the enactment of express limitations on the
representative government.
If we accept this version of events, it becomes clear that the balance
of representative and direct democracy in tax decision-making should be
delineated in terms of appropriate local government functions. Assume
for a moment a pure form of representative democracy where officials
are elected by constituents to act on their behalf in local governance. In
this scenario, local government officials are agents of sorts. They are
empowered by constituents to make decisions on the constituents’
54
behalf on matters delegated to them. This delegation occurs not only

53. Constituents commonly complain that government has failed to represent their
interests. See, e.g., Cathleen Decker, Unhappy but Not About to Change, L.A. TIMES, July 18,
2010, at A33 (citing that approval rates for California state legislators were at 16%, and 22%
for the governor); Steve Kraske et al., In Missouri and Kansas, Wrath Runs High, but Voters
Are Likely to Be Few Tuesday, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 1, 2010, at A1 (citing nationwide high
levels of discontent of Americans, as evidenced by only 21% approval of the job Congress is
doing, and only 33% believing that America is headed in the right direction); Megan TheeBrenan & Marina Stefan, “The System Is Broken”: More from a Poll of Tea Party Backers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at N14 (“They call themselves my representatives, but basically
they don’t represent me. They’re forever saying things like we need to reach across the aisle.
Well, I don’t want you to reach across the aisle. The other side wants to control my life,
overtax me and spend in insane ways.” (quoting a truck driver)); Kate Zernike & Megan
Thee-Brenan, Discontent’s Demography: Who Backs the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2010, at A1 (noting that activists argue that recent healthcare overhaul and government
spending demonstrate that their opinions are not being represented in Washington).
54. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“[A]ll power derives
from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they create.”). For
examples of state constitutions granting local governments such power, see CAL. CONST. art.
XI, §§ 3–4 (stating that counties or cities have the power to adopt their own charters
providing for the type of local governing body and other elected officials); CAL. CONST. art.
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through governing documents such as the state constitution, city charter,
or state statutes, but also through the collective expectations of the
55
electorate. In the following Parts, I will refer to this delegation of
authority through constituents’ collective expectations as an implicit
delegation.
C. Is Voter Control an Effective Political Check or a Power Grab?
In states where direct democracy exists, implicit delegation of
authority by constituents may serve as a very real limitation on the
56
representative government. This is because actions of a representative
democratic government that fall beyond the scope of constituents’
implicit delegation of authority may increase the risk of constituent
revolt. It is reasonable to surmise that constituents perceive voting as a
means of making their voices heard on the range of local governance
issues. However, this is rarely the case, since constituents’ votes for
57
candidates do little to reveal their preferences on individual matters.
As a result, actions of the representative government may have little to
do with constituent preferences. If the local government action or

XI, § 7 (stating that a county or city can enforce “all local, police, sanitary, and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with [state] general laws”); N.Y. CONST. art. IX,
§§ 1–2 (stating that local governments are empowered to elect representatives who in turn
can adopt local laws as long as they are not in conflict with state general or special laws);
OHIO CONST. art. X, §§ 2–3 (stating that counties and townships have township trustees
which are permitted to collect local taxes and have charters which designate the form of
government and determine in what areas counties may have exclusive authority as long as
that power is permitted under the Constitution and laws of the state); and OHIO CONST. art.
XVIII, §§ 3, 7 (explaining that municipalities have similar powers to counties and townships
in that they have the authority to adopt their own charters and adopt local laws as long as not
in conflict with state general laws).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 52, 54. For additional examples of explicit
statutory delegations of power, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. (West 2009). This title grants a wide
variety of powers to municipalities, including, among other things, the power to undertake
school district projects, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5606, acquire land and water rights, id. § 5615,
and provide administrative services to business improvement districts, id. § 5404.
56. For a disturbing example, consider California’s Proposition 8. This controversial
ballot proposition amended the California Constitution to ban gay marriage, which was
formerly available in some California cities, most notably San Francisco. See CALIFORNIA
ATT’Y GEN., OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 128 (2008), available at
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws
.pdf#prop8 (containing Proposition 8’s official language).
57. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1514
(1990) (arguing that voters’ choice of candidates does not reveal their preferences on
individual issues).
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inaction surpasses that which could have been anticipated by
constituents, the government acts without implicit authorization of its
constituents, even if it acts with explicit statutory or constitutional
authorization. Constituents may believe that representatives are either
58
unable to perceive their implicit delegation of authority, or that
59
representatives are simply ignoring the limits of that delegation. As a
consequence, where the cost of an implicitly unauthorized action is high,
constituents may resort to means other than the representative
democratic process, such as complaint, protest, or, more forcefully, a
60
ballot initiative formally limiting the scope of local government. In this
58. See Tracy M. Gordon, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Ballot Box: Causes and
Consequences of Local Voter Initiatives, 141 PUB. CHOICE 31, 33 (2009) (noting that empirical
evidence demonstrates initiatives are employed more frequently in larger, more diverse
jurisdictions, a finding consistent with explanations of direct democracy arising from
“legislative uncertainty about voter preferences”); Eule, supra note 57, at 1504, 1521 (stating
notion that “legislative enactments represent majority will” is a “fiction” and, later, stating
that it is “fanciful” to equate preferences of representatives with preferences of their
constituents).
59. There are a number of explanations for why representatives may not act in
accordance with constituents’ wishes. Because representatives face only binary elections, a
constituent’s vote for a representative is not a guarantee that the representative will act in
accordance with that particular constituent’s desire on a given issue. See Gillette, supra note
22, at 1252. Voters may retain representatives that have done a good job in some things but
not in others, so long as government runs smoothly. Id. Furthermore, local elections may be
less competitive, so the electoral check may be less effective at this level. Id. As a result,
electoral politics do not ensure a truly representative government. Worse yet, dominant
interest groups may possess sufficient power to set the legislative and political agendas so that
voters have only a limited set of choices, few or none of which reflect their preferences. See
Arthur Denzau et al., Spending Limitations, Agenda Control and Voters’ Expectations, 32
NAT’L TAX J. 189, 189 (Supp. 1979). Finally, and more cynically, representatives may
respond to perverse incentives, such as the contrary interests of wealthy campaign donors.
Leib, supra note 52, at 905.
60. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, at 48 (arguing that direct democracy provides
political outlet for citizens who are dissatisfied with representative government); Elizabeth
Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 278 (2004)
(noting that some view initiatives and referenda as causes of poor representative government
but that this view fails to recognize that the resurgence of direct democracy was a direct result
of public distrust and disgust of representative government); Gordon, supra note 58, at 33
(stating that initiatives are employed more frequently in jurisdictions where diversity of
political attributes and lack of stability in population make it difficult for representative
government to discern wishes of the median voter); John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy
Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 185, 192 (2005) (explaining that direct democracy affects
policy by allowing public to “override decisions of unfaithful elected officials”); John G.
Matsusaka, The Eclipse of Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st Century, 124 PUB.
CHOICE 157, 162 (2005) (arguing that legislatures are being replaced by the public in making
laws on important social issues in part because of a decline in confidence of legislatures).
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scenario, we might characterize the resulting ballot initiative as a direct
61
democratic check on representative democracy. Less charitably, we
could characterize it as a collective power grab by constituents in the
political majority to prevent redistribution of assets through the
provision of public goods or direct grants to those in the political
62
minority.
Direct democracy that functions as a power grab rather than a check
is particularly troubling from a normative standpoint.
Just as
representative democratic local governments can overstep their
boundaries by seizing private interests, direct democracy may allow
63
private citizens to overstep their boundaries by seizing public interests.
This happens, at the very least, when direct-democratically enacted tax

61. See Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252 (noting that electoral politics alone may be
insufficient to prevent representative government from acting in contravention to constituent
wishes); Leib, supra note 52, at 905 (arguing that direct democracy allows citizens to correct
for legislators’ response to perverse incentives such as the need to amass campaign
contributions).
62. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293,
294 (2007) (stating that direct democracy is “used to disadvantage minorities”); Clark, supra
note 52, at 434 (explaining that due to uneven voter turnout and influence of special interests,
direct democracy does not necessarily produce a result preferred by constituents); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 288 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“If a majority
be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”); Gillette, supra
note 22, at 1245 (stating that “disparate treatment of taxes and fees implies a distrustful view
of redistribut[ion]” at the local level); Gordon, supra note 58, at 32 (noting that empirical data
demonstrates “that states where the initiative is available have spent less and relied less on
taxes”); Richard Hasen, Assessing California’s Hybrid Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1501,
1502–03 (2009) (book review) (stating that direct democracy is “too blunt”).
63. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 3 (discussing a failed property tax levy that resulted in
police and fire department cuts of more than $5.5 million, and how the city turned off street
lights in an effort to reduce its electric bill, and remove trash cans from city parks in a further
effort to conserve limited funds); Krugman, supra note 3 (“Colorado Springs has made
headlines with its desperate attempt to save money by turning off a third of its streetlights,
but similar things are either happening or being contemplated across the nation, from
Philadelphia to Fresno.”); Karen Kucher et al., Brownout May Have Had Role in Tot’s Death,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 21, 2010, http://www.utsandiego.com/n ews/2010/jul/21/firedept-blames-browouts-toddlere-death/ (discussing how funding cuts to fire department
contributed to death of boy and failure to meet national emergency response time standards).
But see David N. Figlio & Arthur O’Sullivan, The Local Response to Tax Limitation
Measures: Do Local Governments Manipulate Voters to Increase Revenues?, 44 J.L. & ECON.
233, 233 (2001) (stating that cities subject to statewide tax limitations may manipulate
spending to encourage positive tax voting by making visible cuts to services while preserving
spending at the administrative level); Gillette, supra note 22, at 1253 (stating that broad
restrictions on cities’ fiscal authority can have perverse effects on spending, including visible
service cuts intended to induce favorable tax voting).
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restrictions impinge on the representative government’s provision of
64
essential public goods agreed upon through deliberation and debate.
Additional arguments against the use of direct democracy in tax
decisions and other areas of governance are numerous. For instance,
Professor Robinson has asserted that, “[b]y its very nature, ballot box
revenue-collection and budgeting cannot be informed by coherent tax or
65
fiscal policy.” This is mainly a result of procedural defects in the direct
66
democratic process. Critics of direct democracy argue that initiatives
67
68
are often poorly drafted and are seldom understood by constituents.
In addition, the process is subject to capture by well-funded interest
groups even when their objectives deviate from those of the median
69
voter. Furthermore, because voter participation may be quite low,
64. See Clark, supra note 52, at 463 (noting that representative government requires
“balancing, blending, and reconciling the sometimes conflicting desires” of various
constituents into a coherent plan of governance).
65. Robinson, supra note 25, at 518. This is because the direct democratic process makes
it nearly impossible for voters to “consider and accommodate competing principles in the
fiscal lawmaking process.” Id. at 543. Furthermore, the initiative process is less deliberative
than the usual means through which a statute or regulation is created and enforced. See id. at
546–47; see also Leo P. Martinez, Tax Policy, Rational Actors, and Other Myths, 40 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 297, 312 (2009) (“[T]he public seems largely ignorant of how taxes work.”).
66. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, passim.
67. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 297–98 (stating initiatives are poorly drafted
because the usual checks on legislative drafting, such as committee participation and review,
are absent); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, at 77 (discussing that initiatives can be poorly
drafted because they are created by partisans, sometimes in secret); Leib, supra note 52, at
908 (stating poor drafting may be deliberate in an effort to mislead voters).
68. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 299–300 (arguing as a result of voters’ lack of
information on the purpose and function of local initiatives, the process lacks the element of
deliberative debate needed for informed decision-making); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52,
at 76 (drafting may be intentionally complex to confuse voters); Eule, supra note 57, at 1516
(“Considering the complexity and obtuseness of some measures, it’s a wonder anyone knows
what he or she is voting on.”); Shawn P. Flaherty, “Dollars, CPI, and Voter Empowerment”:
Public Act 94-976 and Its Impact on Local Government Tax Referenda, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
377, 387 (2007) (showing surveys of voter comfort with initiatives and referenda reveal that
many voters either needed more information or had difficulty reading and comprehending
the ballot); Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make Laws: How
Direct Democracy Is Shaping American Cities, PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y, July 2008, at
39, 47 (2008) (discussing exit poll of voters in San Diego revealing that a majority were unsure
of contents of ballot propositions and approximately half who answered factual questions
about the propositions gave incorrect responses); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct
Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50
UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1145–46 (2003) (noting that surveys of voters demonstrate that many do
not understand the nature of the ballot measures on which they are voting).
69. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 298 (noting that anyone with sufficient funding
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particularly in local elections, a very small number of voters may drive
70
the decision-making process. Alternatively, a majority of voters may
use the process to push through a political position targeted at a then71
disfavored group such as sexual, religious, or racial minorities. Finally,
because voters have used the direct democratic process to limit local
governments’ ability to raise revenue, and because the amount of
services provided by local governments is directly tied to the amount of
revenue they can generate, direct democratic tax decision-making also
has the power to impinge on the essential functions of local
72
government.
Despite these difficulties, very few commentators have called for the

can avoid checks inherent in the legislative process by simply placing an issue on the ballot);
Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, at 92 (noting that the common criticism of direct
democracy is “that money unduly corrupts the initiative process”); Denzau et al., supra note
59, at 189 (arguing that powerful interest groups may capture the political agenda so as to
present voters with only limited choices, few or none of which reflect median voters’
preferences); Hasen, supra note 62, at 1511 (discussing polling data from California indicating
that voters “are concerned about the role of money” in the initiative process); Kang, supra
note 68, at 1147 (stating excessive campaign spending can influence the election result); Leib,
supra note 52, at 906–07 (arguing individuals or groups with more funding are able to control
the debate).
70. See Clark, supra note 52, at 434 (stating that uneven voter turn-out may engender
results that obscure the popular will); Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 68, at 42 (voter
turnout can be extremely low in local elections); Leib, supra note 52, at 909–10 (explaining
that “empirical evidence also reveals that those who vote in ballot-measures elections are
older, more educated, richer, and more ideological than the general population,” and thus are
not representative); see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 391–92 (noting that low voter turnout for conventional voting may be a reason to favor proportional-tax voting).
71. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (finding unconstitutional direct
democratic amendment of the Colorado Constitution forbidding government from extending
legal protection to gay persons); Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 294–97 (arguing because
direct democracy lacks the checks and balances present in representative government, ballot
initiatives such as the recent Michigan civil rights initiative, may be used to disadvantage
minorities); Oesterle, supra note 7 (showing that in 2004 eleven states approved measures
blocking same sex marriage). For an unfortunate example of this phenomenon in reverse, see
Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative,
Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 19
(1997) (noting that unlike western states, southern states avoided the use of direct democracy
when adopting their post-Civil War constitutions in an effort to disenfranchise recently freed
African Americans). For an international example of direct democracy employed in a
discriminatory fashion, see Nick Cumming-Bruce, Swiss Ban on Minaret Building Meets
Widespread Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at A15 (discussing popular Swiss referendum
banning construction of minarets characterized as Islamophobic).
72. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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73

abolition of direct democracy in tax decision-making. This is because it
74
provides a necessary and useful check on representative democracy.
What is needed, then, is a means of usefully channeling, rather than
eliminating, direct democracy. In other words, the ability of a political
majority to seize power from the representatives—who are supposed to
protect the interests of the political minority—necessitates creation of a
check on the direct democratic check.
Commentators have called for a number of restraints on the use of
direct democracy in tax decision-making, the bulk of which are beyond
the scope of this Article. Suggestions include, among others, amending
state constitutions to limit the use of direct democracy in tax and
spending decisions, limiting voter input on those decisions to referenda
originating with the legislature, offering multiple combinations of tax
and spending choices on ballots to allow for more deliberative decisions,
and changing the final product of the initiative process into instructions
75
to the legislature rather than a constitutional amendment. Although
each of these proposals could certainly have the effect of preventing
direct democratic incursion on essential governmental functions, all but
one of them—offering multiple funding levels on ballots—would create
inorganic strictures on direct democracy’s ability to function as a check
76
on representative democracy. Naturally, any rigid measure designed to
73. Robinson, supra note 25, at 559 (noting that “[r]epeal would be, at a minimum,
politically unpopular”).
74. Id. (arguing that properly structured initiatives “could serve as an important safety
valve and could be a very useful conduit for public opinion”).
75. Id. at 562–65.
76. In addition, there are a multitude of non-tax specific proposals for improvement of
the direct democratic process, some of which I will draw upon in later parts of the Article.
For examples, see Clark, supra note 52, at 471 (noting a recommendation to account for voter
prioritization of ballot issues through (a) “cumulative plebiscitary voting” where “each voter
would be allotted a number of votes equal to the number of initiatives,” which the voter may
distribute among the initiatives according to both priority and preference, and (b) multi-issue
ballot usage where voters may choose between various plausible combinations of government
action); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, at 107–13 (recommending addressing procedural
flaws by requiring use of indirect initiative where citizens first approach the legislature,
instituting word limits and a single-subject rule, requiring a longer qualifying period, and
treating laws resulting from initiatives the same as statutes passed by the legislature); Kang,
supra note 68, at 1143 (discussing a recommendation to address lack of citizen understanding
and competence by providing ready access to “heuristic cues,” such as public endorsement by
prominent figures); Leib, supra note 52, at 915–16 (discussing recommendation to introduce
an element of deliberative debate to direct democracy through creation of a new “popular
branch” of government comprised of citizens who are required to serve for a limited time
similar to jurors and who debate and produce recommendations on issues); Glen Staszewski,
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protect the tax and spending process from popular intrusion will shift
power from constituents to elected representatives, giving
representatives more latitude to act beyond the scope of the authority
implicitly delegated to them. In other words, the two decision-making
processes exist in balance with one another. Unless placed in a
collaborative relationship, one will always lose power when the other
one gains. Our goal, then, should not be a one-size-fits-all solution, but
rather a means of creating the appropriate equilibrium within individual
localities.
Short of an omnipotent oracle to pronounce when direct democracy
is and is not appropriate, we cannot create a locality-specific equilibrium
through rules-based restrictions on direct democracy. For this reason, I
do not suggest any additional inorganic limitation of representative or
direct democratic processes in public finance. Rather, as described
more fully below, I propose retention of the existing direct democratic
and representative processes and the addition of one new piece: creation
of specific opportunities for the exercise of direct democracy in local
government spending decisions. Stated more precisely, citizens should
be permitted to opt out of paying for certain narrowly defined, nonessential expenditures such as local fireworks or movies in the park. Of
course, these opportunities to voice an opinion on spending cannot fully
alleviate the threat of direct democratic usurpation of local
governments’ power to provide the essential goods and services. In fact,
they may seem unimportant at first blush. But giving voters a greater
decision-making role in non-essential spending has the potential to
increase civic participation and buy-in while decreasing the likelihood
that constituents will seek blunderbuss all-or-nothing solutions to local
tax and spending concerns.
D. Why Might Constituent–Government Collaboration Be Beneficial?
Ample evidence supports the assertion that localities may benefit by
allowing constituents to take a role in decision-making on tax and
spending issues. Although the traditional model of collective action
supposes self-interested individuals who will not contribute to the

The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17, 56 (stating recommendation
to apply structural safeguards applicable to federal agency actions, such as notice and
comment hearings and court review using the arbitrary and capricious standard, to direct
democratic actions).
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collective good if they can instead free-ride, behavioral science has
78
proven otherwise. It is now generally accepted that when asked to
contribute to public goods, people will behave cooperatively if they
79
believe that others are doing the same. Likewise, if people believe that
80
others are shirking, they will retaliate in kind. In fact, researchers have
posited that this response to others’ level of cooperation is stronger than
81
an individual’s motivation to maximize wealth. As Professor Kahan
has noted, “In sum, individuals behave like the amoral calculators
posited by the conventional theory only when they believe that others
are cheaters; if they believe that others are morally motivated to
comply, they reciprocate by complying in turn, whether or not they
82
believe they could profitably evade.”
So effectual is the influence of observed cooperation that “collective
behavior is susceptible to multiple, self-sustaining equilibria depending
83
on the beliefs individuals form about the likely behavior of others.” In
other words, when one person cooperates in response to another, her
action may foster the cooperation of a third person, and so on. This may
84
have an observable effect of social influence, which may affect political
85
decision-making. For instance, a bandwagon effect may influence a
constituent to back a winning candidate or cause, or aversion to acting
against popular opinion could prevent a constituent from choosing an
86
unpopular candidate or cause. Studies of why people obey the law

77. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–2 (1965).
78. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 333
(2001) [hereinafter Kahan, Trust] (“[A]s a wealth of empirical social science evidence now
makes clear, Olson’s Logic is false.”).
79. Id. at 334.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 335.
82. Id. at 341–42.
83. Id. at 339.
84. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 6, at 615–16 (“When an individual perceives
that a relatively large group of like-situated people are engaging in a certain form of behavior,
she is more likely to engage in the that behavior, too; this increases the size of the group,
inducing even more individuals [to join the group] . . . .”). “Social influence” can be defined
as the tendency of individuals to conform their conduct to the conduct of others. Dan Kahan,
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 352 (1997) [hereinafter
Kahan, Social Influence].
85. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 84, at 353.
86. Id.
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87

have produced similar results.
As noted by Professor Lederman,
survey data consistently show that people who report compliance with
tax laws believe that other taxpayers are also in compliance, while those
88
who report non-compliance believe that other taxpayers also cheat.
This effect may be the strongest when social influence arises through an
individual’s observation of reference groups, which are groups of people
with whom the individual identifies or with whom she aspires to be
89
identified. Research has shown that not only are people likely to adopt
90
the norms of their reference groups, but “they support or oppose
91
particular regulations as a way to express solidarity with their groups.”
In fact, this can happen even if an individual has no more information
92
about a particular group than the results of a simple opinion poll.
The research described above, if generalizable, suggests that
allowing constituents to take a role in decision-making and allowing
them to access aggregate information about others’ decisions could
create a more cooperative local environment as well as imbue certain
93
spending decisions with more legitimacy. Indeed, research on criminal
punishment has demonstrated that by relaxing its monopoly in favor of
community involvement, the government can achieve greater legitimacy

87. See id. at 354.
88. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1469 (2003).
89. See Richard G. Hall et al., The Effect of Reference Groups, Opinion Polls, and
Attitude Polarization on Attitude Formation and Change, 7 POL. PSYCHOL. 309, 310 (1986).
“Reference group” can be described as a group to which an individual relates and compares
himself. Id.
90. Id. at 319.
91. Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in 50 THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 101, 122 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds.,
2009).
92. Hall et al., supra note 89, at 320.
93. See Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1106–
10 (arguing that because the acts of one’s own group members can imbue state actions with
legitimacy, community involvement in governance can foster a perception of legitimacy);
Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 84, at 352–53 (stating that individuals are more likely to
cooperate when they believe that others are cooperating); see also Levmore, supra note 11, at
406 (noting that moving away from mandatory tax toward voluntary contribution may
develop constituents’ commitment to a cause); Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and
Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 525 (2009) (suggesting that
federal pro-tax messages could be made more salient by allowing taxpayers to earmark a
portion of taxes for public goods that they support).
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94

of action in the eyes of constituents. The same should be true of local
government’s monopoly over tax and spending decisions. Facilitating
constituent choice in areas of non-essential spending should increase
constituent satisfaction with the results of such spending. Furthermore,
overall constituent support for non-essential spending should foster
cooperation on the part of individual constituents, thereby increasing
civic buy-in. In the alternative, if the bulk of constituents are
unsupportive of non-essential spending, the representative government
will be unable to engage in some portion of it. In either case, the chance
of tax revolt is lessened.
III. PROPOSAL FOR OPT-OUT FINANCING OF NON-ESSENTIAL
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
In the second part of this Article, I have suggested that the current
balance of representative and direct democracy in local tax and
spending decisions is suboptimal, primarily because direct democracy
may over-correct for the excesses of representative democracy and
because current forms of direct democracy operate on an all-or-nothing
basis. Over-correction may be a result of constituents’ views that,
although representative local governments have acted within the letter
of the law, their actions have fallen beyond the boundaries of
95
constituents’ implicit delegation of authority to representatives.
Because tax law does not abide by the rules of physics, constituent
reactions to perceived excesses are neither equal nor opposite. Instead,
they have historically resulted in explicit delineations of the
representative government’s authority that may regain the excess and
96
then some.
As such, direct democratic limitations and subsequent
94. See Bilz, supra note 93, at 1110.
95. See discussion supra Part II.
96. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA–D (requiring that all taxes, including special and
general, no matter who they are imposed on, must be approved by voters prior to taking
effect); COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a) (new amendment mandating that there must be voter
approval for “any new tax, tax rate increase . . . or a tax policy change directly causing a net
tax revenue”); MICH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 25, 31 (limiting local property taxes and prohibiting
local government from imposing any new tax or increasing the rate of any existing tax without
approval from a majority of voters in that locality); MO. CONST. art. X, § 22 (requiring voter
approval for any increased or new local taxes); see also Bert Waisanen, State Tax and
CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
Expenditure
Limits—2008,
NAT’L
http://www.ncsl.org/default .aspx?tabid=12633 (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) (noting that voters
in Colorado approved suspending the restrictive limits of the amendment for five years by
allowing the state to retain all revenues, and citing a Washington state initiative requiring

09-HOFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

586

3/20/2012 2:27 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:563

voter refusal to approve tax levies have the potential to impede local
97
governments’ ability to carry out essential functions.
Despite these perceived flaws, I do not propose that states place
additional restrictions on the direct democratic process. In my view, the
threat of direct democracy serves as an important check on local
representative governments. Rather, I suggest that local governments
create additional, targeted direct democratic processes that allow
constituents to express preferences about some non-essential
98
governmental spending as described below.
Specifically, I propose that local representative governments identify
specific items of non-essential spending within the constraints set forth
below and separate them from the remainder of the budget.
Constituents would be permitted to opt out of paying for identified
expenses. By opting out or continuing to pay, constituents could
individually voice and register preferences about the acceptable
delegation of discretionary spending power to the local government. An
opt-out is preferable to an opt-in, I argue, because constituents who
cannot be bothered to opt out generally will not have strong preferences
about the expenses up for debate. These constituents’ lack of strong
preferences justifies a presumption in favor of the representative
government. I further propose basing the mechanism for this process on
an existing opt-out system of public finance. In the paragraphs that
follow, I will describe a German tax system that could serve as a model
for proportionate direct democratic decision-making through an opt-out
process, describe important ways in which my proposed model differs
from the existing German tax, set forth perceived benefits of the model,
and address potential criticisms.
A. The German Church Tax as a Form of Local Tax
Germany, as strange as it may seem, allows some religious

voter approval if state revenue measures result in expenditure above the statutorily provided
expenditure limit).
97. See supra text accompanying note 64.
98. As described in detail below, I view non-essential governmental spending as
spending that is not mandated by state or federal statute, that does not relate to a good or
service that is provided primarily by the local government, and that may fall beyond the
aggregate implicit expectations of constituents about the scope of representative government
given the circumstances in which the spending decision was made. See infra Part III.C.
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congregations to tax their congregants. A vestige of the Middle Ages,
this system is nominally religious in nature but shares many attributes
100
with local taxation in the United States.
As a result, it makes an
101
intriguing model for innovative public finance. Members of religious
congregations are automatically enrolled in the congregation’s taxing
jurisdiction, and taxes chosen by the congregation may be enforced by
102
the state at the congregation’s request. In many cases, congregations
have chosen an income tax that is collected through state wage
103
withholding and then remitted back to the taxing organization.
Congregations often use the collected funds to provide goods and
104
services to the general public, regardless of religious affiliation. These
services, which are equally available to members and non-members in
most cases, include kindergartens, recreation centers, schools, nursing
105
homes, and hospitals, among other things.

99. See WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 137, [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 140 (Ger.); GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND art. 137, 140 [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], Aug. 11, 1919 (Ger.).
100. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 635–37.
101. See id. at 636–37.
102. See, e.g., Kirchensteuergesetz des Bundeslandes Berlin [KiStG] [Berlin Church Tax
Act], Apr. 2, 2009, GVBL. Berlin at 23, § 3(1); Kirchensteuergesetz des Bundeslandes
Sachsen [SächsKiStG] [Saxony Church Tax Act], Mar. 14, 2002, SächsGVBL. at 82, last
amended by Gesetz, Apr. 3, 2009, SächsGVBL. at 153, § 4(1); Kirchensteurgesetz des
Bundeslandes Bayern [Bay KirStG] [Church Tax Act of the Federal State of Bavaria], Dec.
22, 2008, Bay. GVBL. at 973, § 4.
103. See KiStG, supra note 102, § 1(2) (stating that administration of the tax is the
obligation of the tax-entitled religious community unless otherwise provided by law).
Enforcement of the taxes under the statute will be self-administered by the tax-entitled
religious community, according to the Verwaltungs-Vollstreckungsgesetz [VwVG]
[Administration and Enforcement Act], Apr. 27, 1953, BGBI. I at 157, last amended by
Gesetz, July 29, 2009, BGBI. I at 2258; see also Bay KirStG, supra note 102, § 17(1) (stating
that levies must be administered by the religious organization, which may request the State
Ministry of Finance to assume the collection function); Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in
Germany, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 57, 69 (Gerhard Robbers ed.,
1996) [hereinafter Robbers, State and Church].
104. See Robbers, State and Church, supra note 103, at 63 (noting churches provide
charitable works, the absence of which would vitiate the constitution’s guarantee of a social
state); see also Christina Sticht, The Role of the Churches in Germany, GOETHE-INST. (May
2004), http://www.goethe.de/ges/phi/dos/rkd/en2012816.htm.
105. Gerhard Robbers, Minority Churches in Germany, in EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM
FOR CHURCH–STATE RESEARCH, THE LEGAL STATUS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE
COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 153, 163 (1993) [hereinafter Robbers, Minority
Churches]; Jens Petersen, The Church Tax in Germany: A Short Information,
http://www.steuer-forum-kirche.de/church-tax.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
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Strikingly, the tax which helps to pay for these items is completely
avoidable if one is willing to disavow religious affiliation or to switch to
106
a congregation that does not levy the tax. This is easily accomplished
107
Given the relative ease of the opt-out
by filing simple paperwork.
process, one might expect relatively few people to remain enrolled in
108
the tax, particularly since only 22% of Germans are religiously active.
109
But the participation rate is surprisingly high. Nearly two-thirds of all
110
German citizens are official members of tax-levying congregations.
Given the secular nature of German society, one plausible explanation
for the high retention rate is public willingness to support local provision
of public goods by religious organizations also functioning as secular
111
quasi-governmental institutions.
Although categorizing a religious organization as quasigovernmental would be blasphemous in the United States, Germany’s
constitution, which provides that there shall be no state church, requires
German states to grant “public law corporation” status to any
112
requesting religious organization if it meets certain legal requirements.
In addition to the power to levy a tax, status as a public law corporation
confers a number of other important rights upon religious organizations,
including the right to employ clergy and other administrators as civil
servants in the military, hospitals, universities, and other public

106. For instance, see SächsKiStG, supra note 102, § 2 (defining church tax obligors as
all natural persons who are members of the taxing church), and § 3 (stating that to withdraw
from church membership, taxpayers must follow either the individual procedure of the taxing
church or file an official affidavit with a local government office).
107. Id.
108. See Sticht, supra note 104.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 626.
112. The organization’s composition and number of members ensure permanency. See
WEIMARAR REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 137; GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND art. 140 [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], Aug. 11, 1919 (Ger.). In
addition, a religious organization must show that it is not hostile to the constitutional order or
to fundamental rights. See Der Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas in Deutschland e.
V., vertreten durch das Präsidium, 2 BvR 1500 (1997); see also Germany: International
STATE
DEP’T
(2008),
Religious
Freedom
Report
2008,
U.S.
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/71382.htm; Thilo Marauhn, Status, Rights, and
Obligations of Religious Communities in a Human Rights Context: A European Perspective, 34
ISR. L. REV. 600, 631–32 (2000). This rule is intended to safeguard the limited government–
religious corporation partnership envisioned by the constitution. Marauhn, supra, at 631–32.
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113

facilities. In addition, religious organizations that qualify as public law
corporations are exempt from bankruptcy laws, the corporate income
114
tax, gift tax, and inheritance taxes.
Representatives of religious
organizations with public law corporation status also have the right to
participate on public boards, such as the supervisory boards of public
and private broadcasting stations, as well as boards that review films and
115
literature for public suitability. Religious organizations may also draft
116
ordinances applicable to their members. These internal legal systems,
“which operate in parallel to the public laws,” can be striking in their
complexity, and decisions rendered within them fall outside of the
117
jurisdiction of Germany’s public courts. Taken as a whole, these rights
suggest that religious organizations qualifying as public law corporations
should be viewed as quasi-governmental in nature, often functioning in
118
a manner similar to local government agencies here at home.
Like local governments, public law corporations have the power to
119
tax their constituents.
Congregations most often choose income as
their tax base. In all of the German states, the tax is levied at a uniform
rate—8% or 9% of the church member’s federal income tax liability—
and usually collected by the state through wage withholding and then
120
returned to the churches. This results in an effective rate of roughly

113. See Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 105, at 159.
114. See Körperschaftsteuergesetz [KStG] [Corporate Tax Act], Aug. 31, 1976, RGBL. I,
repromulgated Oct. 15, 2002 BGBL. I at 4144, last amended by Gesetz, Apr. 8, 2010 BGBL. I
at 386, § 5(1)(9); Erbschaftssteuer-und Schenkungsteuergesetz [ErbStG] [German
Inheritance Tax Code] § 13(1)(16); Abgabenordnung [AO] [Inheritance and Gift Tax Act],
Apr. 17, 1974, repromulgated Feb. 27, 2007 BGBL. I at 378, last amended by Gesetz, Dec. 22,
2009 BGBL. I at 3950, § 13(1)(6); Abgabenordnung [AO], Mar. 16, 1976, repromulgated Oct.
1, 2002 BGBL. I at 3866, §§ 51–68 (describing some of the qualifications that organizations
must meet to obtain exempt status).
115. Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 105, at 169.
116. See Robbers, State and Church, supra note 103, at 64.
117. Id.
118. Interestingly, state-sponsored churches and churches as local governments persisted
in the original thirteen states far past the date of our nationhood. See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent
and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU
L. REV. 1385, 1457–58 (2004). In fact, religious establishment persisted in Massachusetts until
1833. Id.
119. See GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND art. 140
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], Aug. 11, 1919 (Ger.).
120. This rate is determined by a conference of the taxing organizations. SächsKiStG,
supra note 102, § 10(2). If the organizations cannot agree to a rate, the state finance
administration must determine a rate. Id.; Robbers, State and Church, supra note 103, at 69.
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121

3% to 4% of the member’s income. Like state and local taxes in the
United States, German church taxes are deductible against income for
122
purposes of calculating the federal income tax.
When viewed in this light, the resemblance between religious
organizations that qualify as public law corporations and local
governments is striking. In addition to possessing many quasigovernmental rights, public law corporations use a significant portion of
the money raised through church taxes and governmental grants to fund
123
schools, hospitals, recreational centers, and other social services.
In
other words, public law corporations share not only in the rights of local
governments, but also in their duties. It is this similarity that is most
relevant to my proposal. Germany has, in essence, created local tax and
spending jurisdictions that depend not solely on geography, but also on
the affiliation preferences of constituents. Participation in these
sectarian local jurisdictions is voluntary, and although the jurisdictions
provide more public than private goods, they remain funded and
124
viable.
If we believe claims that Germans are more sectarian than
secular as a group, the continued payment of church taxes by so many of
them is a truly interesting phenomenon and indicates that despite the
perceived threat of free-riders, an opt-out system of financing public
125
goods is possible. Finally, it is worth noting that failure of an opt-out
system to raise revenue is not a failure of the system. Even if the
Furthermore, the tax may be enforced by the state. See KiStG, supra note 102, § 1(2) (noting
that administration of the tax is the obligation of the tax-entitled religious community);
KiStG, supra, § 11 (noting that enforcement of the taxes under the statute will be selfadministered by the tax-entitled religious community according to the Administration and
Enforcement Statute of April 27, 1953); SächsKiStG, supra note 102, §§ 9–10. The state
retains an administrative fee of 4% to 5% of the amount collected. See Robbers, Minority
Churches, supra note 105, at 164.
121. If one assumes an individual income tax rate of approximately 40% and a church
tax rate of 8%, the effective rate is approximately 3.2% of income. For an excellent
discussion of the German income tax, see Walter Schwidetzky & Rolf Eicke, Income Taxation
in the United States and Germany: The Rugged Individualist Meets the Social Activist, 27 J.
TAX’N INV. 3 (2011).
122. See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] Oct. 8, 2009 BGBL. I at 3366, 3862, last
amended by Gesetz, Dec. 20, 2011 BGBL. I at 2592, § 10(1)(4). Furthermore, contributions
to churches made in excess of church tax liability are deductible under EStG § 10(b)(1) so
long as the deduction does not exceed 5% of the donor’s income. Id. § 10(b)(1).
123. Petersen, supra note 105; Sticht, supra note 104.
124. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of German citizens participate in the church tax system.
See supra text accompanying note 110.
125. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 603–04, 636–37.
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German result does not obtain in a non-religious context in the United
States, lack of constituent participation and funding nonetheless
generates information about the preferred scope of representative
spending.
126
It bears repeating that the model must be secular.
I say this not
only because a sectarian version would violate the First Amendment,
but also because the designation of religion as a denominator of tax
jurisdiction would obscure constituents’ preferences about the scope of
representative democratic spending power. Under the current German
system, individuals who support taxation for the provision of public
goods must also choose membership in a religious organization that
127
provides those goods. Individuals having a preference for the former
position but not the latter are faced with two unsatisfactory choices: they
can participate in the tax and join the taxing congregation, or they can
fail to participate in the tax and avoid joining the congregation. Neither
of these options expresses the individual’s true preference for the reach
128
of local government spending.
By disaggregating participation and
religious affiliation, adoption of a secular opt-out model to fund some
non-essential spending would provide a wider range of expressive
options to constituents.
B. Would Lack of Religious Impetus Destroy the Value of a Secular
Model?
Some may argue that once heaven and hell are removed from the
taxing equation, any secular attempt to create an opt-out system will fail
as a necessary consequence of free-riding. This is simply not the case.
Germany’s high church tax participation rate, when viewed in
juxtaposition to its low religious participation rate, demonstrates that
when faced with an avoidable tax, some people will choose to pay rather
129
than avoid. Why do I care about this? It suggests the possibility that if
given the opportunity to make direct decisions about the scope of local
government spending power, constituents may be expected to consider
the merits of the question, rather than simply to avoid any cost to
126. In addition to its normative undesirability, a religious model is prohibited by the
First Amendment.
127. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 636.
128. See id. For this reason, I suggest in a prior work that German states create nonreligious affiliation groups that correspond to religious ones. Id.
129. Id. at 603–04.
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themselves on the basis of self-calculation and the plausibility of free130
riding.
In other words, I argue that we should trust constituents, at
least to the limited extent described in this proposal, to consider factors
that are normatively relevant to the scope of representative local
government’s non-essential spending power when making direct
democratic decisions to either expand or limit that power.
Empirical evidence on the use of ballot initiatives in the United
States supports the position that constituents’ choices are grounded on
131
considerations that extend beyond simple cost avoidance.
Professor
Matsusaka has examined fiscal effects of voter initiatives of the
twentieth century and found that constituent access to the initiative
process does not have a systematic effect on government size or
132
expenditure.
Rather, the combined expenditure of state and local
governments with an initiative process was higher than that of those
without it during the first half of the twentieth century, and it was lower
133
during the latter half.
Based on these data, it is possible to surmise
that during the first half of the century, representatives were less
responsive to constituent preferences for increased spending, whereas
during the latter half of the century, following drastic expansion of
government during war years, representatives were less responsive to
134
The resulting
constituent preferences for reduced spending.
constituent response reveals, in turn, that voters are concerned with
more than simply lowering their own tax liabilities. These results are
not consistent with the frequent assumption that voters will act selfinterestedly, avoiding any cost possible and free-riding if given the
choice.
Instead, the lack of any systematic effect described by Matsusaka’s
data suggests that constituents weigh more than simple cost avoidance
135
when making direct democratic decisions about taxes and spending.
130. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 78, at 333–35 (discussing how individuals behave in a
cooperative rather than a self-calculating fashion when they believe that others do the same,
and empirical evidence suggests that this response is stronger than the personal drive to
maximize material wealth). This is not to say that free-riders will not surface; they will. But
they do not seem to have been an overwhelming impediment in Germany.
131. John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the
Twentieth Century, 43 J.L. & ECON. 619, 641 (2000).
132. Id. at 622.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 641.
135. Id.
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To confirm this position, Matsusaka examined initiatives raised in
California, North Dakota, and Oregon, which are the three most
136
frequent users of the direct democratic process in the United States.
More often than not, voters in these states used the initiative process to
137
increase government spending rather than to reduce it. Furthermore,
several attempts to limit taxes and spending were defeated in these
138
states. These results support the assertion that “the initiative’s main
effect is to bring fiscal policy more in line with the electorate’s
139
preferences.” Once again, the results do not depict voters as simpleminded cost-avoiders.
Matsusaka also found that state and local expenditures were more
decentralized in jurisdictions with the initiative process than in those
140
without it.
In states with the initiative process, spending was more
141
This
likely to occur at the local level than at the state level.
observation supports the assertion that constituents generally prefer
142
fewer spending decisions at the state level and more at the local level.
Constituent desire for local input in spending decisions, coupled with
the observation that constituents consider factors other than cost
avoidance during the direct democratic process, lend credence to the use
of the German church tax as a base model for constituent input on
spending decisions in United States local governments. As noted
earlier, the German system is an imperfect example of opt-out finance
as a direct democratic institution; it relies on religious affiliation as a
denomination of tax jurisdiction, which impedes constituents’ expression
143
of preferences.
Consequently, the first step in creating a domestic
model of opt-out public finance is to identify a neutral denominator of
jurisdiction. Since the model is meant for local governments that
primarily provide geographically-bound goods and services, geography
is the clearest, most rational denominator of jurisdiction, and I will

136. Id. at 639–40.
137. Id. During the period of the study, twenty-one initiatives increased spending and
eleven reduced it. Id.
138. Id. at 640.
139. Id. at 641.
140. Id. at 622.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 636.
143. See supra Part III.A.
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144

adopt it here.
Second, the model must suggest appropriate subject
matter for submission to the direct democratic decision-making process.
Third, the model must describe the decision-making process. Finally, it
must also identify possible choices of revenue base. The appropriate
subject matter, decision-making process, and revenue base will vary
according to the unique features and constituents of each locality.
Consequently, I do not attempt to create a rigid structure that accounts
for all aspects of local governance; rather, I hope to provide a useful set
of observations that may be adapted to fit multiple circumstances.
C. Creating an Opt-Out System of Political Speech: Which Spending
Decisions Are Most Appropriate for Direct Democracy?
As noted earlier, in order to provide constituents with an
opportunity to constructively participate in local tax and spending
decisions, I propose that localities create packages of non-essential
spending that constituents legally could refuse to support for any reason,
including the desire to free-ride. Like the church tax system in
Germany, constituents would automatically be enrolled on the basis of
chosen jurisdictional characteristics, such as place of residence or place
of work. Constituents could then exercise a right to opt out of the
putative charges if they preferred. In addition to rendering other
benefits described below, this system would provide constituents with a
means of directly participating in local governance without impinging
upon essential governmental functions.
Furthermore, because
constituents would have a defined format for making their preferences
known, the likelihood of more intrusive direct democratic participation
would be lessened, while direct democracy would nonetheless remain a
145
potential check on the representative democratic process.
1. Which Spending Is Appropriate?
Only certain kinds of spending are appropriate for inclusion in an
opt-out form of direct democracy; namely, some excessive spending on
essential government functions and some spending on non-essential
government functions. This assertion necessitates delineation of which
144. Furthermore, failure to adopt a geographical model for the provision of public
goods results in an unworkable libertarian utopia if taken to its logical conclusion. Allowing
an unbridled opt-out, untethered by geography, would essentially create a fee-for-services
model of government.
145. See infra Part III.C.4.

09-HOFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011–2012]

3/20/2012 2:27 PM

REDIRECTING DIRECT DEMOCRACY

595

local government functions are essential and which are non-essential.
To my great dismay, defining the term, “essential government function,”
is an academic minefield. As the Supreme Court has recognized, not
only are most feasible definitions laden with political judgments, but the
definition also must vary according to local government purpose,
146
geography, constituent demography, and constituent preferences.
Given the variance among local governments, it would be irresponsible
to attempt to impart universal meaning or produce a static list of
147
supposedly indispensable activities.
For instance, a bright-line
delineation between traditional government functions as essential and
traditionally private pursuits as non-essential is not possible in light of
public–private sector joint ventures, shifting norms, and local variance.
In fact, in its effort to delineate the power of the federal government
to tax and regulate the activities of state governments, the Supreme
Court has moved away from drawing a sharp distinction between
governmental activities and those of private business because the
purportedly bright line between them is “too entangled in expediency to
148
serve as a dependable legal criterion.” As a consequence, any federal
attempt at creating a static definition of “essential governmental
function” “inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it
149
dislikes.” Rather, as Justice Black wrote in Helvering v. Gerhardt, the
identity of essential and non-essential functions is determined mainly by
150
constituents themselves. He observed:
There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of
demarcation between essential and non-essential governmental
functions. Many governmental functions of today have at some
time in the past been non-governmental. The genius of our
146. See Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) (holding that
because governments must respond to constituent demands and because these demands
change over time, federal courts should not employ a bright-line test to determine whether a
particular function is essential).
147. See id.
148. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580 (1946).
149. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546. The Court added that a fixed standard must lead to
“inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic selfgovernance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those
principles.” Id. at 547.
150. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938) (Black, J., concurring).
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government provides that, within the sphere of constitutional
action, the people—acting not through the courts but through
their elected legislative representatives—have the power to
determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the
151
public welfare requires.
For purposes of our proposal, then, it is important to recognize that
local governments engage in a gradient of activities. Some of them are
more important than others in various times and places, and their
importance must be gauged on the local level in light of state and
152
federal mandates.
As a consequence, “essential” eludes a fixed
definition for us just as it has for the Supreme Court. The opposite side
of the coin, “non-essential,” is similarly indefinite. Consequently, I use
the word “non-essential” to refer not to some static academic standard
or list, but rather, to describe spending that is neither essential nor
strictly within the explicit and implicit authority delegated to
153
representatives by their constituents. In other words, “non-essential”
will function as the flip side of a flexibly defined “essential,” meant to
account for the variations in local government engendered by our
federal system.
As a starting point for our definition, let us assume that all state and
federal statutory mandates imposed upon localities are essential
154
government functions.
Although they may not fit within our
colloquial understanding of what is “essential,” these obligations are the
result of superior governmental power, and subjecting them to direct
155
democratic approval at the local level makes little sense.
I propose
151. Id.
152. See id. at 427.
153. Professor Reynolds has also adopted this approach, albeit less explicitly. She
convincingly argues that funding goods and services important to the “general welfare”
through the widespread use of fees is inappropriate. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 387–88. She
adds that local government’s use of fees should be restrained by “commonly accepted values
about the government’s obligation to provide essential services and deeply held convictions
about the public benefit of those services.” Id. at 388.
154. For one example of a federal mandate affecting a municipality, see Jeremy Olshan,
$27 Million to Change NYC Signs from All-Caps, N.Y. POST, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www.
nypost.com/p/news/local/bronx/million_kuj8X4Z2VolVhXnCymfkvM (stating that, for safety
reasons, federal guidelines require city to change street names on signs from all capital letters
to capital and lower case letters).
155. “Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be
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two criteria for determining whether remaining government functions
are essential and therefore not eligible for approval or disapproval in an
opt-out form of direct democracy. First, an essential government
function is one that is provided primarily by the government. Although
private providers may exist, the bulk of citizens depend upon the
government for the particular good or service in question. For instance,
although some citizens may hire private security, most rely on the
police. As a result, the police function falls within the first criterion of
my definition.
The first criterion cannot be the only criterion though. If it were,
anything that the government chose to co-opt would become an
156
essential government function.
Consequently, I propose a second
criterion. At the local level, an essential government function also must
be one that is protected or provided for (although not necessarily
mandated) by state or federal statute. For instance, the provision of
schools, roads, and a police force are generally mandated and regulated
by state law. In contrast, a local government may be the region’s sole
provider of sundaes at the local bandstand, but lack of a related state
statutory provision removes this function from the essential function
category. I rely on state statutes from superior legislative bodies and
predominant provisions by local government as indicia of both necessity
157
and overall public will for the provision of public goods and services.
It bears repeating that public will is far from irrelevant as a criterion for
determining whether a government function is essential. As I have
entrusted to them. . . . The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon
[them] . . . rests in the absolute discretion of the State.” Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S.
161, 178 (1907). Federal and state governmental supremacy has a direct impact on the scope
of action required of or permitted to municipal governments. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra
note 1, at 26, 33 (stating state legislatures have plenary powers to act unless limited by the
federal or state constitution, whereas the power of local governments are not plenary but
instead are “delegated by the state”).
156. Of course, it is possible to argue that rather than government co-option of private
functions, the true danger to constituents is private co-option of governmental function. I do
not believe this to be a viable argument in the context of direct democracy. While it is
possible for the government to seize a private function without the express consent of its
constituents, the reverse is not true. The presence of significant private provision of a
formerly public good or service requires consent by a requisite number of people required for
economic viability. This is not to suggest that local government should or should not continue
to provide a good or service that is also privately provided; rather, it should no longer be
viewed as “essential.”
157. This is because the state statutes come into being through a deliberative process of
debate and compromise by officials who are elected by the broader public.
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described above, if one believes that direct democratic incursion on
governmental functions is more likely to occur when representatives
have imposed high costs on constituents while also acting outside of the
bounds of constituent expectations, the determination of whether a
spending item falls within the authority implicitly delegated to
representatives by constituents is important.
In essence, my proposal would create a mechanism through which
representatives could ask constituents for broader boundaries of
spending authority. The proposal would apply to two categories of
spending: (1) excessive spending on essential functions, and (2) all
spending on selected non-essential functions. For an example of the
158
first category, consider once again the local police force. Most people
agree that providing a police force is a core activity of local government,
and indeed, it meets both criteria of my definition of essential
159
governmental function.
But is all spending related to this function
necessarily essential government spending? Here, the consensus breaks
down. For example, in most parts of the country, most people will agree
that providing the police force with cars is a necessary expense, but
should those cars be unmitigated jalopies? Used Ford Crown Royals?
New Bentleys? The example demonstrates that it is possible to have
non-essential government spending on an essential governmental
function. These kinds of spending would be appropriate for inclusion in
an opt-out system, provided that they meet the other criteria described
below. Of course, a similar inquiry into the nature of spending is not
necessary for non-essential government functions. For purposes of this
proposal, all spending on a non-essential government function is non158. Even famous libertarian Robert Nozick believed that the police force was essential
for the protection of private rights in property. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 149–55 (1974) (explaining that the state requires minimal police force and other
minimal powers to secure private property rights).
159. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 3 (stating that the city will soon be without many
services citizens consider basic, including a cut of more than $5.5 million in police and
firefighting that will result in many vacant positions); see also Keith Eddings, Car Thefts
Skyrocket in Lawrence After Police Layoffs, EAGLE TRIB. (N. Andover, Mass.), Aug. 15,
2010, at B3 (noting citizens have complained that cutting officers is the wrong move in this
economy because people may try to take advantage of the shortage); Nicholas J.C. Pistor,
East St. Louis Cuts Include Almost Third of Police Force, ST. LOUIS POST–DISPATCH
(Jul. 31, 2010, 12:25 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/east-st-louiscuts-include-almost-third-of-police-force/article_328f01fc-6e92-55fc-89c2-4794e0c5a575.html
(discussing that the city faced a loss of nearly a third of its police force and that citizens are
concerned for public safety considering the area’s high crime rate).
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essential spending.
2. Why Do Constituents’ Expectations Matter?
As described in Part IV below, I propose delegating decision-making
160
authority over certain “non-essential spending” to constituents. This
raises a new question: why should we care about constituents’
expectations of their representative government? After all, state
statutes grant broad powers to local governments, and one may argue
that the election process weeds out tone-deaf representatives who act in
161
unexpected ways.
However, this argument assumes that local
constituencies have adequate information about the actions of
individual representatives and that they will voluntarily participate in
local elections.
In most municipal and county elections, these
162
assumptions simply are not true.
Rather, most constituents have
relatively little input in local elections, and most representatives have
163
relatively little information about the preferences of their constituents.
Lack of information on both sides of the local government equation
164
is troubling.
In the aggregate, constituents’ expectations of
representatives are directly relevant to the scope of local government
165
This is true for two reasons. First, it is constituents
spending.
160. For purposes of this proposal, I define “non-essential spending” as spending on
items that are provided primarily by the local government and which is either mandated by
state or federal statue or is clearly within constituents’ expectations. See supra Part III.C.1.
161. But see Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252 (discussing how local elections are less
competitive and representatives face only binary voting, so electoral politics alone may be
insufficient to prevent representative government from acting in contravention of constituent
preferences).
162. See id.; Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 68, at 47 (noting example of local voters
who often lacked the requisite information to make decisions consistent with their own
interests); Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252 (discussing how local elections are less competitive
and representatives face only binary voting, so electoral politics alone may be insufficient to
prevent representative government from acting in contravention of constituent preferences).
163. See Gordon, supra note 58, at 33 (stating that empirical analysis supports assertion
that representatives’ uncertainty about voter preferences increases with increasing size of the
jurisdiction, increasing number of unaffiliated voters, and decreasing residential stability);
Brian D. Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System 26–27 (Fla. St. Univ. C.L., Pub. L.
Res. Paper No. 394, 2011), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473107
(arguing that lobbying will affect whose voices are heard by representatives and how
representatives choose to distribute resources).
164. See Kang, supra note 68, at 1143 (stating that voters are commonly criticized as
ignorant and not competent to make choices in their own best interest).
165. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 387–88 (arguing that choice between use of tax
revenues or fees per service as means of funding government-provided goods should be
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themselves who imbue the representative process with legitimacy.
Elected officials, if they truly represent constituents, must stand in the
constituents’ stead when they act in an official capacity, even during the
process of debate and compromise. The scope and legitimacy of that
166
action necessarily depends on the consent of the governed. Perhaps a
formalist view of the situation would insist that expectations do not
matter because the constituents have consented, de facto, to the exercise
of any local government power granted by state statute or constitution.
After all, they control the creation of such powers through other
democratic processes such as the election of state representatives or
167
exercise of the initiative power. This argument fails, however, because
it ignores the unique features of individual localities. A spending
decision that is fully legitimate in light of the expectations of one city’s
constituents may be completely illegitimate in light of the expectations
of another city’s constituents even though both decisions may be
168
Notice
permissible uses of local government funds under state law.
that the distinction between these two instances of spending is not a
clearly defined line; rather, it is a gradient of acceptability. Employing
my proposal would cover some of the distance necessary to determine
the boundaries of that gradient.
The relevance of constituent preferences to the available gradient of
representative spending decisions is best demonstrated by example. For
instance, Ohio law provides that municipalities may provide funding and
169
other assistance to park districts. Almost no one would question the

determined with reference to “commonly accepted values about the government’s obligation
to provide essential services and deeply held convictions about the public benefit of those
services”).
166. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“[A]ll power derives
from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they create.”); see
also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”).
167. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 26 (stating that the scope of local
government power is determined solely by delegation of state constitution or legislative
grant).
168. For instance, it is perfectly reasonable for the City of Chicago to expand its system
of public transit, whereas such a decision would not be reasonable in my hometown of Berlin
Heights, Ohio, which had a population of roughly 700 people in the 2010 U.S. Census. See
Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: Berlin Heights Village, Ohio, U.S.
CENSUS BUR., http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?
pid=DEC_10_DP_DPDP1&prodType=table (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
169. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.211 (LexisNexis 2008).
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authority of a representative local government to fund a reasonably
sized park, lawn care, landscaping, and even athletic fields. But what
about, for example, a zoo? A zoo is most certainly a park, but the
legitimacy of a local government’s decision to fund a zoo will depend on
constituent preferences despite the fact that the decision is sanctioned
by state statute. When voting for representatives, the electorate of a
small rural city would never contemplate the founding of a zoo as being
within the scope of their representatives’ authority at the time of
election, whereas the electorate of a larger city could foresee the
possibility of such a decision and therefore could take it into account
when choosing representatives. It would be a heroic stretch to say that
representatives of both cities are authorized by their constituents to
fund a zoo simply because state law permits it.
Next, consider a city’s choice to fund the zoo’s acquisition of a rare
and endangered animal, such as a panda bear. The enormous expense
of acquiring the animal and creating a suitable habitat and plan of
maintenance might exceed even the expected range of activity for
representatives in a large city. Even though representatives who made
this choice would be acting within the bounds of their statutory
authority, two things are very likely to be true. First, acquisition of a
panda bear, while related to an essential government function, the
provision of parks, is almost certainly a non-essential expense. Second,
while representatives may consider the acquisition of a panda bear
advantageous to the city, they will not know constituents’ aggregate
preferences about the use of tax dollars to fund such an acquisition
because the purchase was unexpected at the time of election and
therefore not subject to debate by constituents. Unless representatives
ask constituents directly about the expense, their purchase will represent
a sheer guess at the scope of their authority to spend public money on a
non-essential item. That is not to say that purchase of the bear is bad or
will produce disutility, only that it is so far beyond the expected course
of government action that it could not be described as representative in
170
the colloquial sense.
I provide this example not as a demonstration of which expenses
170. One can imagine a number of other examples; perhaps a Magna Charta for the
local library, Audis for the police force, and a golf course designed by the now-infamous
Tiger Woods. Each of these expenses falls within the scope of activities permitted by the
state constitutional and statutory grants of municipal power. It is clear, however, that these
expenditures are not essential.
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should be included in a system of opt-out public finance, but rather to
highlight the fact that constituent preferences are directly relevant to the
legitimacy of a particular local expenditure, even if that expenditure is
unquestionably legal in light of the state constitution and statutes. If a
particular government expenditure cannot be anticipated by
constituents as a response to the circumstances that generated the
government’s choice, we might question whether the expenditure falls
within the authority delegated by constituents to their representatives.
If not, the expenditure may be appropriate for a direct democratic
decision-making process. Since this is the case, I conclude that
aggregate constituent preferences regarding the bounds of
representative authority should be considered when determining
whether a particular expenditure is non-essential and therefore
appropriate for the opt-out form of direct democracy described in this
Article.
Of course, my position is subject to criticism. It would not be
entirely misguided to argue that the representative democratic process is
theoretically self-correcting; speaking proverbially, voters can kick the
171
bums out.
Furthermore, it is clear that aggregate constituent
preferences should be ignored if they would impinge on essential
172
government functions. Neither point detracts from the vitality of my
proposal. It is possible for successive administrations of elected officials
to systematically flout constituents’ implicit expectations about the
scope of local government, particularly in areas where constituents have
insufficient or incorrect information, or where constituent participation
173
in local elections is low.
The passage of Proposition 13 and many
other direct democratic limitations on government’s taxing power may
suggest that where taxes and spending are involved, representative
democratic processes have historically turned a blind eye to
constituents’ preferences. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that
representatives wish to respect, but do not know, constituent

171. But see Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252 (arguing that local elections are less
competitive, making the electoral check on representatives less effective); Leib, supra note
52, at 905 (noting that representatives have perverse incentive to pander to interests of
wealthy campaign donors).
172. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 387–88 (asserting the importance of protecting
essential services that are important to the general welfare).
173. See supra Part II.
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preferences regarding the bounds of government authority. The optout mechanism envisioned by my proposal relieves pressure on the
constituent–representative relationship in either instance.
3. Who Should Have the Power to Designate Non-Essential Expenses
for Inclusion in an Opt-Out System: Government, Constituents, or
State?
a. Local Government Possesses Sufficient Information
My proposal, that local governments allow constituents to make
direct choices about certain items of non-essential spending, is intended
to foster a new balance between representative and direct democratic
decisions in local government spending.
Specifically, allowing
constituents to directly address spending decisions that fall at or beyond
the boundaries of constituents’ implicit delegation of power to
representatives will lessen the likelihood of a power grab by constituents
175
through ballot initiative or similar processes.
In other words, this
proposal should apply only to non-essential spending, as it is described
above. Allowing constituents to directly influence decisions about
reasonable spending for essential government functions would
jeopardize the processes of deliberation, planning, and compromise that
176
protect political minorities from the tyranny of the majority.
As a
consequence, I cannot emphasize strongly enough that only those items
of spending that will not jeopardize citizens’ access to essential
government services and protections should be subjected to the
177
proposed decision-making process.
As described above, for purposes of this proposal, an expense is
essential when it is reasonable in amount, reasonably related to a
governmental function that is elucidated by state statute, and primarily
178
provided by the local government. An expense is clearly non-essential
174. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 427 (delegation of decision-making authority on
government spending may be desirable when constituents have knowledge superior to that of
the legislative body).
175. See infra Part IV.B.
176. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 294, 299–300 (arguing that ballot initiatives may
be used to disadvantage minorities, and unlike legislation, they provide no opportunity for
deliberation and compromise).
177. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 387–88 (asserting the importance of protecting
essential services that are important to the general welfare).
178. See supra Part III.C.1.
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when it does not meet this definition and falls outside of the authority
delegated by constituents to their representatives either explicitly or
179
implicitly.
In other words, if a particular government expenditure
cannot be anticipated by constituents as a response to the circumstances
surrounding the local government’s choice, representatives should
question whether the expenditure falls within their delegated authority.
In such a case, representatives may seek constituent input through the
direct democratic decision-making process. For instance, no one would
question a representative local government’s decision to collect
180
residents’ yard waste. This activity encourages sanitary conditions and
increases property value at little cost to taxpayers. To take it one step
further, few people would object to a local government’s decision to
purchase wood chippers for the purpose of turning yard waste into
mulch. This decision is a logical corollary to the collection of yard
waste. But how would residents react to a costly expenditure for dump
trucks used to deliver the resulting mulch to any resident for free?
Constituents’ reactions to this gradient of spending will vary by locality.
While not as outrageous as our prior example, the small town zoo, the
cost of delivering free mulch is not likely to be essential and may be
appropriate to include a group of expenses for direct democratic
approval. In the absence of an omniscient and communicative third
party, representatives themselves are in the best position to observe
181
local preferences and decide which expenses may be non-essential.
b. Constituents Have Insufficient Information
Although it may appear suboptimal to trust this decision to the body
whose judgment constituents have historically distrusted, a second
option—letting constituents designate non-essential spending—makes

179. See supra Part III.C.1.
180. See Mark Ferenchik, Yard Waste a Community Effort: Even if City Service Returns,
Residents Plan to Continue Sharing Burden of Disposal, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 25,
2009), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2009/03/25/leafbags.ART_ART_03-2509_B1_L1DBIMV.html (stating that more than 1000 residents called the city to complain
after the service was halted); Robert Vitale, Columbus Will Resume Collecting Yard Waste:
Council Approval Means Pickup Will Start in Mid-April, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 23,
2010, at B1 (noting that yard waste collection resumed after revocation of service was deemed
the most unpopular budget cut of 2009).
181. See Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669,
1673–74 (2007) (arguing that smaller governments can provide legislation that more closely
fits the preferences of constituents).
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even less sense. First, representatives can aggregate information on the
preferences of constituents in a way that is not possible for constituents
182
themselves.
Although representatives may not know constituents’
views on a particular expenditure (free delivery of mulch, for instance),
the lack of knowledge itself is an important piece of information
indicating that a particular expenditure may be a good fit for opt-out
financing. In contrast, allowing constituents to designate expenditures
subject to direct democratic decision-making would expand the very
tendency that this proposal seeks to cabin, the tendency to interfere with
essential government functions. Finally, even if we disregard the first
two assertions, lack of effective coordination would prevent constituents
from designating non-essential spending. In essence, constituents would
have to vote on what to vote on. The process simply would be too
unwieldy to enact.
c. State Government Has Insufficient Information, Resources, and
Flexibility
A third option for designating non-essential expenditures eligible for
inclusion in an opt-out system—allowing states to choose them—raises
similar problems. It is unlikely that the state will possess adequate
information to make informed choices about local non-essential
183
spending.
If the state acts statutorily to create a one-size-fits-all
package of non-essential spending eligible for inclusion in an opt-out
system, the designated items will only mesh with local constituent
preferences if the state is largely homogenous. Furthermore, these
provisions, once statutorily enshrined, will be unlikely to change in
184
response to changes in localities and may become quickly outdated.
Finally, it is not feasible for most states to address the issue individually
for each locality; the work load simply would be too great. As a result,
lodging designatory power at the state level makes no more sense than
granting it to constituents.
The representative governments of

182. See Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing that the public
“lacks the ability to collect and to study information that is utilized routinely by legislative
bodies”), rev’d en banc, Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997).
183. See Gillette, supra note 22, at 1255 (explaining that state actions regarding local tax
and spending decisions may be “lumpy and sticky,” made in response to the interests of state
legislators rather than local constituents, and may interfere with the local government’s
function “without producing any offsetting benefit”).
184. Id.
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individual localities are best situated to choose which expenses to
include in an opt-out system.
4. Structuring Direct Democracy to Best Reveal Preferences
A workable opt-out structure must address criticisms of the use of
direct democracy, and particularly its use for proportionate decisionmaking in public finance. Most of these concerns, which are fully
described in Part IV, can be alleviated by creating a structure similar to
the German church tax that allows constituents to weigh in at any time,
with full information about both the proposed spending and the actions
185
of other constituents.
Therefore, I propose that local representative
governments, after identifying suitable proposed expenses,
automatically enroll constituents as contributors to those expenses
subject to the participation base discussion below. Constituents, who
would then be “voluntary taxpayers,” to employ an oxymoron, could opt
out of their contributions by filing a signed writing with the appropriate
186
authority. As I discuss below, the proportional aspect of this system
would necessitate further consideration of the expenses chosen for
inclusion, but it would provide a more complete picture of constituents’
187
delegation of non-essential spending power to representatives.
In
addition, it would provide constituents with a novel outlet for political
speech. In the paragraphs that follow, I outline criticisms of direct
democratic decision-making in public finance found in the existing
literature and explain how the structure of my proposed system avoids
many of these pitfalls.

185. German churches levy a tax against their members that is generally collected
through wage withholding. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 603–05 (describing German church
tax laws and customs). Members can avoid this tax by renouncing membership in the taxing
congregation, which they are permitted to do for any reason and at any time. Id. at 605.
Church membership rolls are not disclosed to the public. See id. at 603.
186. I would include signed electronic writings in this category, although use of the
internet has not yet been approved for voting. I presume that the legality of an internet optout would vary from state to state.
187. For a discussion of which expenses are appropriate for inclusion, see supra Part
III.C.
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IV. CRITICISMS AND THE STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS THAT ADDRESS
THEM
A. Tyranny of the Majority
One important criticism of direct democracy is that its reliance on
majority rule runs roughshod over concerns of the political minority,
which are better provided for by the deliberation and compromise
188
For instance, in direct
process of representative democracy.
democracy, one can imagine a large number of citizens without wealth
supporting high taxes to extract money from a wealthy few. Conversely,
one could imagine a large number of wealthy citizens supporting low
189
taxes to avoid redistribution to those who are less wealthy. In either
situation, the political minority has little power over its own destiny,
despite the use of democratic processes meant to afford each citizen an
190
equal voice. This is problematic, particularly in the second scenario,
where direct democratic opposition to taxes could impede the provision
of essential government functions to citizens who are unable to purchase
191
substitutes like private security or schools.
My proposal addresses this problem in three ways. First, it applies
only to non-essential spending, which protects constituents who are
unable to provide private substitutes for that spending. Second, as
Professor Stark has suggested, majority rule can be limited by
permitting the representative democratic government to put boundaries
192
on the direct democratic process. For instance, a referendum created

188. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 294 (arguing that ballot initiatives may be used
to disadvantage minorities); Stark, supra note 9, at 208 (“Majorities misbehave, and there is
reason to institutionalize procedures to limit such mischief.”).
189. See Gillette, supra note 22, at 1245 (stating that “disparate treatment of taxes and
fees implies a distrustful view of redistribut[ion]” at the municipal level); Reynolds, supra
note 17, at 375 (“[A]ffluent, homogeneous enclaves are able to capture the wealth within
their borders and tax it only to serve the needs of their similarly situated neighbors.”).
190. See Clark, supra note 52, at 442 (indicating that voting systems are means to allow
people to participate in crafting the government, and no one voter should have more
influence than any other voter).
191. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 294 (arguing that ballot issues may be used to
disadvantage minorities); Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit
Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171,
185 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (stating that at higher levels of income, constituents
supplement or substitute public goods with private ones, such as home and business security
systems, home trash compactors, and electronic air filters to provide a cleaner environment).
192. Stark, supra note 9, at 209 (in a referendum, direct democracy essentially acts as a
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by the legislature is far more likely to be the product of deliberation and
compromise than a ballot initiative instigated by an interest group or
193
voters.
My proposal adopts this strategy by allowing representatives
to identify non-essential spending that will be included in the opt-out
package. Third, and importantly, the opt-out system is not an all-ornothing proposition. Rather, it allows for proportional decision-making,
which provides voters in the political minority with direct and
194
meaningful input.
B. Proportional Decision-Making Is Not Indicative of Public Choice
A second potential critique of the opt-out system is that its financial
result may not be indicative of public choice. On the subject of
proportional tax voting, Professor Levmore has observed that although
a particular constituent can control whether or not he contributes to a
given expenditure, he has no say in the overall level of funding raised for
195
a particular item. As a result, a constituent’s contribution can produce
196
For
the constituent’s preferred level of funding only by accident.
instance, assume that a representative local government decides to seek
constituent approval for the cost of landscaping a park that is currently a
wild meadow. The cost of fully landscaping the park will be $100,000,
and the locality has 10,000 constituents. Each constituent will be
charged $10 unless he or she opts out of the payment. Now assume that
60% of the residents would prefer no landscaping. The remaining 40%
are in favor of granting representatives full authority to make the
$100,000 expenditure. Out of these, 10% are in favor of any level of
landscaping, but the remainder are in favor of landscaping only if the
“democratic filter over and above that offered by the representative processes”).
193. See Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing that the public
“lacks the ability to collect and to study information that is utilized routinely by legislative
bodies”), rev’d en banc, Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Robinson, supra
note 25, at 543 (indicating that “legislative fiscal policy-making . . . is an iterative process,” yet
it is not easy for constituents to consider the cumulative effect of a series of ballot initiatives).
194. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 398–99 (noting that proportional voting seemingly
provides a policy result that is proportionate to constituents’ enthusiasm, although it may
impose external costs not inherent in traditional voting where a minority funds a project that
is not favored by the majority).
195. See id. at 394–95 (noting that the check-off for federal election campaign funding
found on federal income tax return forms could only produce the public’s preferred amount
of funding by accident since no single voter has information about any other voter’s actions).
196. Id. at 394 (noting that without knowledge of other voters’ choices, a constituent
may inadvertently overfund a particular item against her preference).
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full $100,000 is committed to the project.
In the scenario above, a simple opt-out system produces a highly
flawed result. If 60% of constituents who prefer the unlandscaped
meadow opt out of the $10 payment, the resulting $40,000 of revenue
may still permit the government to landscape the park, leaving these
constituents dissatisfied. Furthermore, the 30% of constituents who
wanted $100,000 of landscaping are also dissatisfied, even though they
contributed to the cause. They view the project as underfunded and
therefore substandard. In the end, only 10% of constituents are happy
197
with the result of proportional tax voting in this example.
This conundrum may be addressed by refining the role of the
representative government in the proposal. In the example above, the
representative government has forwarded a fixed-budget capital project
for approval. While I certainly do not discourage seeking other forms of
voter input on this kind of project, capital expenditures are not ideal for
an opt-out funding format for two reasons. First, partial completion of a
capital project is never satisfactory, but a representative government can
never obtain anything more than partial funding through opt-out
financing. Second, capital undertakings require voter approval at a
specific point in time. The project must be approved at the outset,
which means that each constituent must cast his or her vote without any
198
information about what others have done.
As a result, the example
produces a nonsensical outcome.
The problems identified above can be avoided by narrowing the
kinds of spending subjected to the opt-out regime and by increasing
representative government input in the choices presented to voters.
First, representatives should identify spending that is recurring rather
than capital in nature. Second, the identified spending should also fall
into the “more is better” category. For instance, rather than subjecting
the cost of park development to the opt-out process, representatives
could choose the cost of showing outdoor movies in the park. This is
clearly a non-essential expense that, depending upon the locality, may
199
fall outside of the usual scope of governmental spending authority.
197. Another example may be the construction of a public monument that would inspire
some but offend many others.
198. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 394–95 (noting that without knowledge of other
constituents’ actions, constituents can only vote in favor of their preferred funding level by
accident).
199. In other words, one can imagine some residents asking why the local government is
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Furthermore, most people would agree that, within a reasonable range,
it is better to have more movies than fewer.
1. Setting a Floor and a Ceiling
In addition to choosing appropriate expenses for inclusion in the
opt-out system, the representative government must play an additional
role in my proposal: determining the acceptable range of revenue
necessary to fund the non-essential item. It is possible to identify a
plethora of more-is-better spending that might be undertaken by local
governments. Pancake breakfasts, free trees on Arbor Day, cooking
classes, the provision of sports equipment, evening concerts, and many
other things initially seem better in bulk. However, upon closer
examination, this is not necessarily the case. Let us return for a moment
to movies in the park. Assume that a representative local government
forwards movies in the park as an item of non-essential spending to be
approved through the opt-out system. If all but a few constituents opt
out, perhaps the locality will screen one movie but will not be
authorized to show more. If all constituents remain enrolled rather than
opting out, the government may raise more money than is practical.
Does this mean that the representative government should show double
features every night? Surely not.
Because it is possible for constituents in an opt-out system to under
or oversubscribe to a particular discretionary expense, the
representative local government should choose a pre-set spending limit
200
and spending floor. These levels, above which the funded activity is a
nuisance, and below which it is futile, should be presented to
constituents along with a description of the activity in which the locality
seeks to engage. When funds are raised above or below these limits,
they should be remitted to constituents or applied to constituents’ other
liabilities to the representative government.
2. Replacing a Fixed Voting Date with a Rolling Opt-Out
Placing a pre-set ceiling and floor on discretionary spending does not
completely solve the problem described in our park example above.
wasting their tax dollars on a free showing of Jersey Girl.
200. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 394–95 (noting that unless constituents are fully
informed of others’ actions, they can only reach an appropriate level of funding
inadvertently). This problem is cured in the opt-out system described here because
constituents can choose to participate or not on a rolling basis.
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Although set points inform constituents of the range of funding with
which a project will go forward, a pre-set range may not correspond with
any individual constituent’s preferred range. For instance, imagine a
constituent who would prefer between two and four outdoor movies but
who has an intense preference against a fifth movie or more. Now,
imagine that this constituent’s representative local government has
designated a range of funding that would provide between four and six
outdoor movies. If all constituents have only one opportunity to either
remain enrolled or opt out, our imaginary constituent will not know
which choice will result in four movies rather than six. However, if
constituents are permitted to make their decisions on a rolling basis, our
imaginary subject can wait to see what others do before making her own
decision.
A rolling opt-out also allows constituents to respond to changes in
circumstance, whereas a single vote taken on a fixed date would not.
This means, of course, that local governments could not rely on future
funding for expenses included in the opt-out system and would be
unable to budget for them. I do not find this troubling, since the
expenses that I have identified as appropriate fall into the “want” rather
than the “need” category and are not capital in nature. By setting a
floor and ceiling and by allowing a rolling opt-out, localities can avoid
the nonsensical outcome reached in the park example above.
Furthermore, this additional input from the representative government
will ensure that revenue collected through the opt-out system is
plausibly linked to the actual preferences of constituents.
3. Choice of Participation Base
Having narrowed the range of expenses eligible for inclusion in an
opt-out system, it becomes necessary to ask who will bear the burden of
those expenses. Two specific questions must be answered. First, should
participation in the opt-out system include individuals who reside
outside of a local government’s taxing jurisdiction but work within it?
And second, should participation in the opt-out system be confined to
constituents who pay taxes, or should it be extended more broadly? For
the reasons explained below, localities should answer both questions by
including as many participants as possible.
a. Should Participation Be Confined to Residents of the Charging
Jurisdiction?
One frequent criticism of direct democracy in the tax and spending
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context is that it allows residents of one locality to shift a tax burden that
is rightfully theirs to residents of another locality who have no right to
201
vote on the increase. For instance, rationally acting residents who live
in a central city that serves as a hub for commuters should always vote in
202
favor of increased income taxes on wages earned within the city limits.
The amount of revenue collected from non-residents will exceed that
collected from residents, leaving the city with a net gain. Furthermore,
because non-residents do not vote for representatives of the city
government, they have no say in how the city uses those funds. The
same situation may arise with respect to sales taxes that will affect
shoppers from neighboring localities, or property taxes that will be
203
levied on vacation homes.
The examples above assume that the relationship between
commuters and residents of the central city is rationally adversarial.
Theoretically, commuters want to use the resources of the city without
contributing to them. Conversely, city dwellers want to extract
resources from commuters. But this may not always be the case.
Because commuters use and enjoy the central city for work, it is entirely
reasonable to make the opposite assumption: that commuters want to
contribute resources for the betterment of the central city, and that city
dwellers will use additional resources in a way that makes the city
attractive to both commuters and residents. An opt-out system
applicable to both residents and commuters permits this non-adversarial
relationship to develop by allowing both groups to contribute jointly to
non-essential spending that will benefit both groups. In addition, use of
the opt-out system addresses a small portion of commuters’
disenfranchisement in tax voting by allowing them to express their

201. Stark, supra note 9, at 195 (noting that the “chief distinguishing feature” of local
taxation is that some taxpayers will be unable to participate in the democratic decisionmaking process by reason of their residence in another locality).
202. Even delegates at the federal constitutional convention were concerned that direct
democratic voting by a low-wealth majority would threaten the individual property interests
of the high-wealth minority. See Eule, supra note 57, at 1542.
203. See Stark, supra note 9, at 195 (noting that individuals’ mobility between local
jurisdictions, and their resulting inability to participate in tax decisions that affect them,
“highlights the weakness of the referendum as a yardstick of taxpayer consent”); see also
Denzau et al., supra note 59, at 198 (stating that economic modeling suggests that voters may
support spending limitations at one level of government if they perceive that doing so will
export that burden to another level of government).
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204

preferences alongside those of residents.
Commuters who are
troubled by the fact that they are not permitted to participate in
representative government elections, or by any other aspect of the optout charge, can simply and legally refuse to pay. For these reasons,
localities should err on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion.
b. Should Participation in the Opt-Out System Be Confined to
Taxpayers, or Should It Include All Constituents?
Localities adopting the opt-out system face a second question of
inclusion: whether to bill all constituents or limit liability solely to those
who already pay a recognized form of tax. Traditional tax policy
considerations of equity, efficiency, and simplicity initially suggest that
the opt-out system should apply only to taxpayers. These individuals
have already been allocated a portion of the public burden on the basis
of sufficient property ownership, consumption, or income, and
piggybacking the opt-out system on current tax collection mechanisms is
likely to save government time and resources.
However, such
efficiencies produce a poor result in this context because they
205
disenfranchise would-be voters who are not taxpayers.
Because the
opt-out system should be envisioned as a means of political speech
rather than a means of raising revenue, considerations of equal voice
must trump the tax policy analysis.
Of course, it may be argued (though not by me) that
disenfranchisement in this context is a superficial problem. If local
governments confine the opt-out system to non-essential spending,
failure to make the proposed expenditure will not result in failure to
provide the government’s usual goods and services. Rather, a mass optout by uncooperative taxpayers will merely prevent the local
government from providing “bonus” goods and services. Because
essential services and other services ordinarily provided by the
204. Here I note a potential inconsistency in the theoretical underpinnings of my
proposal. If using opt-out financing allows constituents (meaning “residents”) to better
express their preferences regarding the scope of representatives’ non-essential spending,
injection of non-residents into the system will distort the desired outcome. I resolve this
matter by asserting that, in the scenario described above, both commuters and residents are
“constituents” of the representative government. Both groups contribute funds to the
representative government, and the government must consider both groups when making
decisions about infrastructure, taxes, spending, and other considerations.
205. Staudt, supra note 11, at 566–67; see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 388 (noting
that where only taxpayers are permitted to vote, “[s]uffrage is restricted”).
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government would not be disrupted, the expectations of non-taxpaying
residents would be protected. In addition, because funds collected
through the opt-out system are as much like voluntary charitable
contributions as they are like taxes, it is not normatively clear that the
entire constituency should have a say in their eventual use.
A much stronger argument exists, however, for making the inclusion
206
of constituents as broad as possible. If we view the opt-out system not
as a means of raising revenue, but rather as a means of constituent
speech, the preferences of constituents who are not traditional taxpayers
207
should be valued on equal footing. Professor Staudt makes this point
in regard to a familiar federal tax option: the voluntary election to
208
contribute to federal campaign financing. She notes that the election
serves as a mechanism of political expression but is nonetheless afforded
209
only to taxpayers.
Because the election is equivalent to the right to
vote on how to spend federal revenue, she argues that it should be
extended to all individuals regardless of taxpayer or non-taxpayer
210
status. By analogy, the same holds true for the opt-out system.
Of course, one might argue that governments should not ask low
income constituents for money. But in an opt-out system, basic
211
concerns of distributive justice are vitiated.
The inclusion of low-

206. See Clark, supra note 52, at 437 (“No one can or should have more input than
anyone else.”).
207. See Staudt, supra note 11, at 556–57 (arguing that special rights afforded to
taxpayers at the federal level are equivalent to voting rights and should be afforded to all
individuals, not just taxpayers). In fact, it is unconstitutional to tie voting rights to tax
payments. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). The Court, in finding
Virginia’s poll tax unconstitutional, wrote,
[W]e must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is
limited to the power to fix qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally
disfavored.
Id. (citations omitted).
208. Staudt, supra note 11, at 565–66; see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 388 (noting
that where only taxpayers are permitted to vote, “[s]uffrage is restricted”). For a general
description of the federal election campaign check-off, see Levmore, supra, at 388–91.
209. Staudt, supra note 11, at 566.
210. Id. at 556–57.
211. A tax is regressive when lower income taxpayers share a greater percentage of the
burden than high-income taxpayers. Flat fees are regressive because they comprise a greater
proportion of the income or wealth of taxpayers at the lower end of the economic spectrum.

09-HOFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011–2012]

REDIRECTING DIRECT DEMOCRACY

3/20/2012 2:27 PM

615

income constituents cannot result in an undue financial burden because
they can opt out of payment. Furthermore, failure to give nontaxpayers the option to participate could be interpreted as both
patronizing and paternalistic: patronizing because the representative
government seems not to value non-taxpayer input on the non-essential
spending proposal, and paternalistic because it suggests that government
cannot trust these constituents to make decisions in their own best
interest.
Although there are dangers to automatic inclusion, it is preferable to
exclusion. Assume, for instance, that Constituent A is a low-income
retiree who is a resident of Locality B. Locality B has designated free
tai chi lessons as an opt-out item. Although Constituent A is not a
taxpayer, she favors free lessons and would like to contribute to their
establishment. If she, and others in her position, are not included in the
opt-out system, her only means of expressing a preference is by making
an unsolicited, voluntary contribution. This, however, is unlikely to
happen. First, Constituent A may not learn of the opt-out item if she is
not enrolled in the system. As a result of her lack of knowledge, she will
be barred from expressing a preference even if she could do so legally.
Second, even if Constituent A learns of the opt-out item and intends to
contribute, she must also know of the mechanism for making a
voluntary contribution, if one exists. Given the often opaque nature of
local government, contributing may be difficult at best, and only the
most persistent non-taxpayers will express a preference.
Third,
establishing a parallel system to process voluntary contributions is likely
to be an inefficient use of local government resources. As a result, it is
preferable to include all constituents in the opt-out system.
Some may argue that the initial inclusion of all constituents could
result in a regressive outcome if constituents at very low levels of
212
income remain enrolled for reasons other than preference.
For
instance, handicapped or illiterate constituents may face barriers when

See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 358–59 (5th ed. 1989).
212. For a corollary, consider consumer protection laws that shield individuals from
transactions where they are simply unable to protect their own interests. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1345.03(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that “knowingly [taking] advantage of
the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect the consumer’s interests because of the
consumer’s physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the
language of an agreement” is an unconscionable consumer trade practice).
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213

interacting with government.
If the process of opting out is too
onerous, these constituents, who are more likely to have less wealth, will
contribute to non-essential government spending in contravention to
their preferences when constituents who are not similarly disadvantaged
214
will not be forced to do so.
I find this argument unpersuasive for three reasons. First, it is
patronizing to assume that entire groups of people will be overwhelmed
by interaction with the government. It is far more likely that particular
individuals will encounter difficulty rather than entire groups. As a
result, individual solutions are preferable to group exclusion. Second, to
the extent that entire groups do encounter difficulty, simple procedural
solutions exist. For instance, if we assume that most constituents over
the age of ninety will encounter difficulty because they are less mobile
or internet facile, a locality could provide them with targeted assistance,
215
such as large-print, postage-paid mailers.
Finally, exclusion of some
groups on the basis of their assumed lack of functionality may result in
disingenuous disregard for the preferences of constituents in those
groups.
Furthermore, exclusion of these constituents, even if
benevolently motivated, may be perceived by them as malicious,
resulting in additional pressure on the constituent–representative
relationship. Inclusion of all constituents is, therefore, preferable.
4. Form of the Charge
Having concluded that the greatest possible number of participants
should be included in an opt-out system, it becomes necessary to
determine what form the opt-out charge should take. Because it
addresses the transfer of funds from constituents to the local
government, this consideration is analogous to the determination of an
216
appropriate tax base. Like the decision of which expenses to include
in the opt-out system, this choice will depend, to some extent, on the
217
individual circumstances and laws applicable to a particular locality.

213. See id.
214. See id.
215. For additional discussion on disenfranchisement of the elderly, see Kingshuk K.
Roy, Sleeping Watchdogs of Personal Liberty: State Laws Disenfranchising the Elderly, 11
ELDER L.J. 109 (2003).
216. For a discussion of tax base, see MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 211, at 328–
30.
217. For instance, many state constitutions prevent cities within those states from
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As a preliminary matter, it is possible to dismiss levies against
property as an inappropriate form of the opt-out charge in most
localities. First, if property ownership were employed as a basis for
calculating the charge, all non-owners would be excluded from the
218
system, which is objectionable on disenfranchisement grounds.
Second, levies as a percentage of sales may be dismissed on grounds of
administrative infeasibility. The opt-out charge would be identified with
particular individuals, and it is not currently practical for localities to
219
track sales taxes paid by particular individuals. Furthermore, even if
tracking individual sales became administratively feasible in the future,
the use of a levy against sales would make the amount of the opt-out
charge dependent upon the individual payor’s purchases. As a result,
the amount of the payment would depend on a factor unrelated to
constituent preference. Neither would it correlate to the amount of the
non-essential expense forwarded for approval by the representative
government.
Attaching the opt-out charge to an income tax would be a better
option administratively, if not substantively. For instance, the German
system levies a charge at the rate of 8% or 9% of an individual’s federal
220
income tax liability. Pegging the opt-out charge to federal income tax
liability accomplishes two goals in Germany. First, it creates economies
221
of scale in collection. Because the church tax is automatically withheld
from a taxpayer’s wages in many cases, religious organizations are able
222
This
to piggyback on the state’s existing collection mechanisms.
levying an income tax. In such cases, calculation of the opt-out charge could not be tied to
income.
218. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668–70 (1966) (holding that tying
votes to wealth violates the federal Equal Protection Clause).
219. Of course, technological development will change the face of tax information
reporting in the future. See Jay A. Soled, Call for the Gradual Phase-Out of All Paper Tax
Information Statements, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 345, 348 (2010) (“[A]ccurate and timely tax
information should be delivered electronically, supplanting our anachronistic delivery system
of paper tax information statements.”).
220. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 604. This rate is determined by a conference of the
taxing organizations. SächsKiStG, supra note 102, § 10(2). If the organizations cannot agree
to a rate, the state finance administration must determine a rate. Id.; Robbers, State and
Church, supra note 103, at 69.
221. The state retains an administrative fee of 4% to 5% of the amount collected, which
is far less than it would cost the organizations to conduct collections themselves. See
Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 105, at 164.
222. See Bay KirStG, supra note 102, § 17(1) (stating levies must be administered by the
religious organization, which may request the State Ministry of Finance to assume the
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significantly lowers administrative costs of the tax. Second, by
calculating the church tax as a percentage of federal tax liability, the
223
German system incorporates federal adjustments to tax.
Assuming
that these adjustments promote important public objectives, duplicating
them through adoption of tax liability as the opt-out base would further
224
those objectives.
There is a glaring problem with using income as a measure of optout liability. As discussed above, doing so will disenfranchise lowincome constituents who pay no tax. Furthermore, pegging an opt-out
charge to the income tax is not possible for local governments that do
225
not levy such a tax. Doing so is also unlikely to generate an amount of
revenue that corresponds in any way to the anticipated non-essential
government expense. Finally, an income tax base would devalue the
contribution of those who earn little income and would completely
226
disenfranchise those who pay no tax.
Although the appropriate choice of contribution base will vary
according to the circumstances and laws of a given locality, we have
arrived by process of elimination at a flat charge per constituent.
Importantly, a flat charge is inclusive of all constituents, and it affords
each constituent equal weight in political speech. A flat charge may also
be tied directly to the anticipated amount of the non-essential expense.
For instance, if each movie in the park will cost $200, and
representatives determine that the project should move forward if at
least twenty constituents support it, the flat opt-out charge should be
$10. This kind of calculation would be nearly impossible with an
income, sales, or property-based charge.
As usual, a flat charge is not without problems. Because a flat
charge could not be withheld from wages in the way that an incomebased charge could be, it may be more expensive to administer. Second,
collection function); see also Robbers, State and Church, supra note 103, at 69.
223. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 604–05.
224. I do not assert that a particular set of concerns exists in both systems, but practically
speaking, since both systems involve public finance, it is probably the case. For instance, the
concern of a family’s ability to pay versus a single person’s ability to pay may arise in both
cases.
225. Not all cities levy a local income tax. See HENRY J. RAIMONDO, ECONOMICS OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 171, 186 (1992) (stating that income tax in most states is
imposed by state government and local income tax levies are usually made by large counties
or cities).
226. In effect, this would set up a pay-to-play system.
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a flat charge is subject to attack on the distributive justice front. If each
participating constituent pays $10 to fund movies in the park, the charge
will be a lesser percentage of a wealthy person’s resources than of a
poorer person’s resources, making it regressive. In a mandatory funding
structure, this discrepancy would be troubling. I argue, however,
regressivity is mitigated by constituents’ ability to opt out of some or all
of the charge. Consequently, I conclude that although it is not perfect, a
flat charge is the best contribution base for use in an opt-out system.
V. BENEFITS OF ADOPTING AN OPT-OUT SYSTEM
Having outlined my proposal for the use of an opt-out system to
finance certain non-essential local government expenses, I now address
why constituents’ expression of preference for the scope of
representatives’ spending authority should be tied to constituents’
contributions toward certain items of non-essential spending. In other
words, why not ask constituents to simply vote yes or no on any given
issue of spending? Although doing so may be appropriate in some
circumstances, the opt-out model offers benefits not available through a
simple vote. In addition to addressing strong critiques of direct
democracy—that direct democracy encourages tyranny of the majority
and allows residents to export their tax burden to other localities—tying
preference expression to actual dollars fosters democratic debate even
where most constituents do not speak in the traditional sense.
In addition to creating a de facto debate, using an opt-out system as
a complement to existing forms of direct democracy could result in a
number of other benefits. First, it satisfies constituents’ normative
227
intuitions about the libertarian nature of local government while
sheltering the ability of representative government to provide essential
goods and services. In addition, it confers legitimacy on the items of
228
spending that would be most subject to question by constituents.
Together, these benefits should quell the tendency of constituents to
overreach through use of other direct democratic processes such as the

227. See Stark, supra note 9, at 194; see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 406 (arguing that
tax voting allows constituents to voice an opinion on government’s choice of cause-based
spending).
228. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 11, at 406 (explaining that constituents may tolerate a
greater level of redistributive spending if they can help government choose the beneficiaries
of that spending).
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229

ballot initiative.
Second, use of an opt-out system would place local
governments on equal footing with charitable organizations in areas
230
where the functions of these two groups most strongly overlap. Under
favorable conditions, governmental restraint in use of the taxing power
to fund certain non-essential spending might result in an efficient
allocation of resources between these two groups. Third, an opt-out
system has the potential to encourage deliberation among constituents
by providing a steady stream of information about the preferences of
other constituents and representative government over time. It also
231
would provide a mild form of non-geographical Tiebout sorting,
allowing constituents to either provide or avoid supporting the provision
of public goods without relocating to another locality. Finally,
widespread use of an opt-out system has the potential to change
constituents’ assumptions about one another. Namely, successful
funding of non-essential goods solely through the consent of
constituents would go some distance toward dispelling the traditional
anti-tax American stereotype that currently dominates popular culture
232
and academic literature.
Perhaps it is simply not the case that
Americans are not civically minded. Contradiction of the unsupported
stereotype by actual facts has the potential to change the tenor of
political debate and constituent decision-making at the state and local
levels.
A. Creating a Non-Verbal Dialogue
An important benefit of the opt-out system is the creation of a nonverbal democratic dialogue among constituents. Direct democracy is
often criticized on the grounds that constituents must vote without the
benefit of deliberation that would have resulted from the representative

229. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of
Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 879 (2002) (stating that
alienation and distrust of government lead to increased resort to direct democracy).
230. Cf. Galle, supra note 163, at 36 (“[T]he argument that charity fills in where
government cannot has been oversold.”); David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable
Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L.
REV. 221, 262 (2009) (explaining that government budgets are large and ranges of public
goals are vast, and therefore, government cannot provide the same focus on fit and quality).
231. For a brief discussion of Tiebout sorting, see infra Part V.D.
232. For a discussion of the prevailing stereotype of Americans being opposed to
taxation, see infra Part V.F.
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233

democratic process.
In addition, constituents must vote without the
234
benefit of fully knowing the preferences of their fellows.
Using an opt-out system to finance certain non-essential expenses
addresses these concerns somewhat. In a system that automatically
registers the response or non-response of every constituent, all
constituents must express some preference, either de facto or otherwise.
Unlike a traditional voting process, it is not possible to remain silent in
an opt-out system. This is because a dollar amount is attached to either
opting out or remaining enrolled in the system. In an ordinary direct
democratic vote, a constituent may remain silent by simply avoiding the
polls. In contrast, an opt-out system requires each constituent to pay or
235
not. In other words, dedication or removal of funds from the cause is
tantamount to political speech or, to put the matter more crassly, money
talks.
Of course, a choice to opt out or remain enrolled in the system is not
perfectly expressive, and either choice could mean a number of things.
Lack of perfect expressiveness is not, however, a cause for concern.
First, although the information provided by the opt-out system is not
rich in detail, the system creates a strong form of constituent expression
that is clearly and unquestionably cognizable to representatives. Unlike
verbal or written speech, which may or may not be heard, payment or
non-payment of money directly affects the course of action available to
representatives. This conveys information about the constituents’
implicit delegation of non-essential spending authority to
representatives, even if the reason for the scope of that delegation is
opaque. Consider a constituent’s choice to opt out. Perhaps the
constituent favors an item of non-essential spending but simply cannot
afford to contribute to it, or alternatively, the constituent objects to the
project itself, whether or not it is affordable to the constituent. The
objection could be substantive (the constituent does not like movies in
the park), or it could be political (the constituent does not think that the
government’s role includes movies in the park). These three meanings
are vastly different, but all of them lead us to conclude that the
233. Robinson, supra note 25, at 546 (noting that deliberation in legislative enactment is
the reason for “reliability of and judicial respect for” the representative democratic process).
234. Levmore, supra note 11, at 394–95.
235. Indeed, Professor Staudt makes a similar point with regard to taxpayers’ federal
Form 1040 check-the-box election to dedicate funds toward election campaign contributions.
See Staudt, supra note 11, at 565–66.
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constituent objects to the non-essential spending at issue and that he
does not authorize the representative government to use his dollars to
236
engage in it.
Likewise, a constituent’s continued enrollment in the system could
have disparate meanings. Among other things, continued enrollment
could mean that a constituent approves the proposed spending, neither
approves nor opposes the proposed spending, opposes the proposed
spending but remains enrolled out of a sense of moral obligation, or
opposes the proposed spending but is either unaware of or unable to
237
exercise the opt out.
In the second instance, where a constituent neither approves nor
opposes the proposed spending, the constituent cannot be said to care
about the scope of the representative government’s authority with
regard to the spending. In essence, the constituent remains enrolled in
the opt-out system as a result of the stickiness of the default option.
Although this inertia does not truly express a preference on the
particular item of spending in question, it is expressive in another way.
By failing to opt out, constituents who neither approve nor oppose nonessential spending express the view that the debate is unimportant. If
that is true, and if a constituent contributes funds despite her apathy, the
opt-out system should make a presumption in favor of granting
discretionary spending authority to the representative government,
which has presumably arrived at the item through a process of debate
and compromise.
In the third instance, where a constituent opposes a particular nonessential expense but feels morally obligated to contribute, the response
should be treated, once again, as a grant of discretionary spending
authority to the representative government. In fact, this situation is not
so different from the imposition of actual taxes. Where a constituent
remains enrolled in the system with little interest in the actual project at
hand, he has made a decision to contribute to the general welfare of the
community through the creation of public goods regardless of whether
he will use them. As a result, we should not be troubled by the fact that
the constituent’s response does not reflect his own preference about a
236. If the constituent objects to non-essential spending on grounds that he cannot
afford it, he may, of course, be willing to authorize the representative government to spend
other people’s dollars on the project.
237. As mentioned earlier, instances in which a constituent would prefer to opt out, but
is somehow prevented from doing so, can be minimized through procedural protections.
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particular project. His continued participation indicates his preference
238
about the scope of the representative government’s authority.
In a transparent opt-out system, where constituents are able to see
the responses of others (although not necessarily match those responses
with the identities of others), a series of non-verbal communications
automatically arises on the topic of the proposed expenditure. Unlike a
traditional direct democratic vote, every constituent is a participant, and
if the system allows a rolling opt-out, each constituent can express his or
her preference while armed with sufficient knowledge of the choices of
others. Furthermore, because funds are attached to the choice to opt
out or remain enrolled, each constituent’s expression of preference has a
direct impact on the success of the collective endeavor and directly
affects the course of action taken by the representative government.
B. Averting the Tax Revolt
Providing even a minor outlet for some pressure inherent in the
constituent–representative government relationship has the potential to
produce more reasoned constituent voting on levy requests and may
even avert further tax revolt. Although some may view “[t]he tax
239
revolt” primarily as a problem of the 1970s, there is no reason to
conclude that direct democratic incursion into state and local spending
240
decisions is no longer a threat. Constituents have the ability to block
needed rate increases. In addition, nothing prevents constituents and
interest groups from using the initiative and referendum processes to
241
impose new limitations on representative governments. As a result, it
238. In fact, it could be argued that such a response is, in fact, a stronger grant of
authority than one from a constituent who favors the project.
239. See David Lowery, The Attitudinal Consequences of the Tax Revolt, 4 POL. BEHAV.
333, 333 (1982) (referring to “[t]he tax revolt” as a single event that “swept across the United
States” after the passage of California’s Proposition 13).
240. See Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 929 (noting that as a country, the United States
must “maintain the delicate balance between healthy and self-destructive tax protest
[because t]he current debate has shown no such balance or moderation”). In fact, Lowery’s
empirical study concluded that voters remained as dissatisfied after the tax revolt as they had
been before it. See Lowery, supra note 239, at 342.
241. In fact, a number of tax and spending limitations appeared on the ballot in fall 2010.
See, e.g., Tim Hoover, The Colorado Vote Amendments 60, 61; Proposition 101 “Ugly Three”
Appear Headed for a Big Loss, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 2010, at B1 (discussing the voters’
rejection of Amendment 61, which would have “prohibited the state from any kind of
borrowing and limited local governments to borrowing only for ten years”); Ballot Questions
Ready for June, MORNING SENTINEL (Waterville, Me.) (Apr. 15, 2010), http://
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is in the best interest of representative governments to understand the
phenomenon of tax revolt and to find means to address it. Using an optout system to provide constituents with some level of input on
discretionary spending decisions may be one such means.
To know whether this is true, or even desirable, we must first
understand potential causes of tax revolt. Scholars have posited a
number of causes, none of which are mutually exclusive, and four
242
general categories have emerged.
First, it is possible that some
constituents favor direct democratic limitation of tax and spending
because they perceive state and local government as unnecessarily large
243
in scope.
Research has shown this to be a strong influence in tax
244
revolts. Indeed, one relevant study has shown that beliefs about the
245
appropriate size of government play a strong role in tax revolt.
In
246
such instances, a vote in favor of revolt is an attempt to limit that size.
Second, some constituents may favor tax revolt because they perceive
247
the state or local government as wasteful.
In these cases, a vote for
limiting the government’s tax or spending power is not necessarily an
attempt to limit the size of government; rather, it is an attempt to force
248
greater government efficiency.
Third, some constituents may favor
direct democratic limitations of tax and spending simply because they
are worried about their “personal finances” or “the economy in
249
general.”
Finally, some constituents may be disenchanted with state
www.onlinesentinel.com/news/ballot-questions-ready-for-june_2010-04-14.html
(discussing
Maine’s then-upcoming vote on Question 1: “Do you want to reject the new law that lowers
Maine’s income tax and replaces that revenue by making changes to the sales tax?”); Colin
Sullivan, Calif’s Little-Noticed Prop 26 Squeaks Through in Dead of Night, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/11/03/03greenwire-califs-little-noticed-prop-26squeaks-through-59912.html (discussing California voters’ adoption of Proposition 26, which
changed the definition of environmental fees).
242. See Lowery, supra note 239, at 334–36 (aggregating and categorizing numerous
academic theories on the cause of tax revolt).
243. Id. at 334.
244. Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 912 (stating that research showed “‘the central issue
in the tax revolt was how much government should be doing, not so much whether it was
doing it well or badly’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting DAVID O. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX
REVOLT 187 (1982))).
245. Id. (describing an empirical study on the causes of tax revolt).
246. See Lowery, supra note 239, at 334 (theorizing tax revolt was aimed at trimming “a
bloated government”).
247. Id. at 335.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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250

and local government overall.
These voters are not necessarily
251
concerned with the specifics of government’s scope or efficiency.
Instead, they are voicing non-specific dissatisfaction through a readily
252
available channel.
Constituents who are prone to vote in favor of tax and spending
limitations as a result of the categories above could voice similar
positions through an opt-out system. Admittedly, the practical effect of
acting through the opt-out system may be of a lesser magnitude.
Refusing to contribute to movies in the park, for instance, is much
different from acting in concert with others to enact a strict property tax
limitation. Nonetheless, it is not clear that all constituents require a
strict property tax limitation in order to achieve psychic satisfaction
from their actions. For instance, empirical studies of Costa Rican
politics have shown that constituents dissatisfied with national
government seek participation at the local level before turning to
253
protest. This indicates that if given the choice between a less drastic
and a more drastic political act, constituents may choose the less drastic
option. This is particularly true in light of the time and resources
254
required to initiate most direct democratic processes.
An opt-out
system would provide one means of less drastic action, functioning as a
form of pressure valve.
C. Improved Allocation of Resources
An additional benefit of using an opt-out system for the provision of
certain non-essential public goods lies in its potential to create a more
reasoned allocation of resources between local governments and
charitable organizations. The appropriate acquisition and allocation of
privately held property for use in the provision of public goods is a topic
255
that has received extensive consideration in academic literature.
To
date, most scholars have assumed that government is an insufficient
provider of public goods and that its function must be supplemented by
250. Id. at 336.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See John A. Booth & Mitchell A. Seligson, Political Legitimacy and Participation in
Costa Rica: Evidence of Arena Shopping, 58 POL. RES. Q. 537, 547 (2005).
254. See supra text accompanying note 69 (citing expense as a factor in ballot initiatives).
255. See Galle, supra note 163, at 2; Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416–20 (1956); Weisbrod, supra note 191, at 185.
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256

charitable or private providers.
Myriad theories exist to support
nearly innumerable variations of a normatively desirable allocation
257
scheme, but few of them have focused on the interplay between
258
Rather, the debate
charitable organizations and local governments.
has focused on the propriety of federal tax subsidization of charitable
259
organizations or private providers of public goods.
Despite the assertions of many scholars that government is a
suboptimal provider of public goods, it is far from certain that charitable
260
organizations or other private providers are categorically superior. In
other words, there is no clear reason to favor allocation to charitable
organizations over government in every instance. However, the
converse is also true; it is not clear that government is a superior
261
provider of public goods.
As Professor Galle has written, both
governments and charitable organizations may have substantial
262
advantages but also may be subject to substantial flaws. For instance,
in most cases the government possesses significant advantages of scale
263
and scope and is able to provide a wide variety of public goods and
264
services. In addition, decisions made by the government are the result
of deliberation and compromise, whereas decisions made by charitable
organizations may result from the interests of a very small group of

256. See Galle, supra note 163, at 2 (noting that prevailing theory for justification of tax
subsidization of charitable organizations is market failure); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner,
The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2022–23 (2007) (arguing for
subsidization of for-profit firms engaged in the provision of public goods).
257. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 518–28 (2010) (cataloging theories that justify
the exemption of charitable organizations’ income from taxation).
258. See Galle, supra note 163, at 13.
259. See Fleischer, supra note 257, at 518–28; Malani & Posner, supra note 256, at 2020–
21 (summarizing subsidy theories and suggesting that none justify coupling tax benefits with
not-for-profit status).
260. See Galle, supra note 163, at 5 (stating that it is possible “that many of
government’s putative flaws are equally true of charity”).
261. See id.
262. See id. at 36–49 (arguing that multiple factors affect the relevant balance between
provision of public goods by charitable organizations or by the government and that no single
factor is dispositive).
263. For example, the government may effectively integrate education with children’s
public health, but doing so would be far more difficult for a charitable organization. See id. at
72 (government has advantages of scale and scope).
264. See id. at 4.
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265

people.
Furthermore, elected officials may be scrutinized more
heavily by the public than managers of charitable organizations,
266
resulting in actions more consonant with constituents’ expectations.
Finally, in some locations, competition among local governments may
result in a more efficient provision of goods and services, or, in
267
combination with Tiebout sorting, a more constituent-appropriate mix.
Charities, however, are not without strengths, and governments are
not without weaknesses. As a result, there are some instances in which
charitable organizations may be better providers of public goods and
268
services than the government. For example, charitable organizations
269
In
may have better access to information than the government.
addition, they may be better situated to recruit talented employees and
270
volunteers.
Furthermore, because they are not beholden to the
median voter, lobbyists, or strong political backers, charitable
organizations may increase diversity of public goods and be more
271
responsive to minority preferences for more or different goods.
Finally, donors to charitable organizations may receive the benefit of a
“warm glow,” or personal satisfaction from donating that may not arise
272
from the duty to pay taxes.
Whether one or more of the characteristics described above inures
to any particular local government or charitable organization is a pure
question of fact. As such, the answer must necessarily vary among
organizations along a number of variables, including constituent
demography, geographic scope, and the ability of constituents to exert
influence over either local governments or charitable organizations. As
a consequence, any blanket determination of the appropriate allocation
of resources among local governments and charitable organizations
must rely on a set of generalized assumptions that will hold true for no
locality whatsoever.
Although useful for generating a set of
265. See id. at 41 (noting that the nonprofit sector lacks a cross-organizational
mechanism for “debating conflicts and coordinating priorities”).
266. See id. at 46.
267. For a brief description of Tiebout’s theory, see infra Part V.D.
268. See Galle, supra note 163, at 4–5 (noting that commentators have cited ability to
attract talent and gather information as relative strengths of charities versus government).
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. Id. at 10–11.
272. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 526–
27 (1990).
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considerations to be used at the local level, broader academic theories of
allocation, and their necessary assumptions, break down when viewed in
light of individual circumstances faced by constituents in any given time
or place. In other words, scholars simply do not have sufficient
information to describe an ideal allocation in light of the United States’
federal structure. The desirability of any given allocation will depend
heavily on factors, the weight and presence of which may be judged only
by those close to the entities in question.
In this regard, an opt-out system of funding certain non-essential
goods would delegate a portion of the decision-making process about
allocation among local governments and charitable organizations to
constituents. Rather than invoke its mandatory taxing power to fund a
specific public good or service, local government would leave the
allocation decision to constituents. These constituents could choose to
fund the good or service through the government or to divert their
resources elsewhere, either to provide the same or different public
goods through charitable organizations, or to private consumption or
saving. In any of these cases, the representative government would
receive valuable input about constituents’ views on government
provision of the service.
Again, it is worth noting that constituent input would be non-specific
(i.e., the representative government would not learn the specific reasons
why constituents do or do not favor government provision of the good).
But the actual channeling of dollars by constituents either to charitable
organizations or to private consumption or saving would nonetheless
speak to the breadth of the representative government’s role in areas
where it overlaps with that of charitable organizations. This construct
has the benefit of allowing constituents to individually consider factors
important to them, including those set forth in academic literature on
the allocation of funds between governments and charitable
organizations. Because constituents are more likely to have adequate
information about factors affecting ideal allocation between the two
types of institutions at the local level, their participation may result in a
more normatively desirable allocation than a formulaic or generalized
academic approach.
Facilitating constituent choice has additional benefits. For instance,
it would level the playing field between governmental and charitable
providers of public goods in areas where they overlap. Whereas, the
government may invoke its mandatory taxing power, and therefore has
a competitive advantage in the marketplace of funding, charitable
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organizations may not do so. This disparity is problematic because it
may allow local government to force government provision of an
inferior version of the good when charitable organizations may be better
positioned to provide a superior version. Allowing constituents to select
a favored provider through an opt-out system would provide equal
opportunity for competition between charitable organizations and the
government.
In other words, equal competition between local
government and charitable organizations is desirable as an alternative to
“crowd out,” where the provision of low quality goods by the
government may discourage some donors from contributing to
charitable organizations that would provide a higher-quality version of
273
the same goods.
In addition, preserving the option of government
provision allows constituents to take advantage of the government’s
ability to provide economies of scale and scope if they exist in a
274
particular locality.
Furthermore, allowing constituents to voluntarily
participate in funding a particular good through the government would
extend the phenomena of warm glow or pure altruism beyond the
borders of charitable contribution and would minimize the mental costs
of compulsory taxation, allowing more constituents to enjoy psychic
275
benefits not readily available in the absence of an opt out.
To summarize, I do not suggest that an opt-out system could or
should take the place of charitable giving, or that charity should
supplant government provision of public goods. Rather, I emphasize
the point raised both here and in Professor Galle’s work that larger
theories regarding the optimal provision of public goods often fail to
account for variations in the capability of local government and the
276
needs of the local populace. Although it is not a complete cure, the
273. See Galle, supra note 163, at 55, 67–68 (describing crowd-out and observing that if a
constituent in this circumstance makes the unlikely decision to both pay tax and donate to a
charitable organization that provides the same good, she has effectively paid twice).
274. Id. at 3, 67–68, 72 (government has massive advantages of scale and fundraising).
275. Id. at 67 (offering warm glow as a partial justification for federal subsidization of
charitable organizations); Schizer, supra note 230, at 225–26, 230 (arguing that facilitation of
voluntary contributions may increase altruism and “warm glow,” as well as minimize the
welfare costs associated with compulsory taxation).
276. Professor Galle has argued that subsidization of charitable organizations is
necessary or desirable where a charitable organization’s mission is multi-jurisdictional. Galle,
supra note 163, at 5–6, 86–87. Subsidization may also be desirable when the local government
is of limited effectiveness resulting from reduced competition as a result of constituents’ high
moving costs or lack of information about rival jurisdictions, or from excess interjurisdictional competition that prevents local governments from providing public goods. Id.
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opt-out system goes some distance toward addressing this concern. It
moves toward recognition that where local governments and charitable
organizations assume overlapping functions, equal competition for funds
could produce a result that more closely aligns with constituent
knowledge and preferences.
D. Creating Non-Geographical Tiebout Sorting
Another benefit of the opt-out system is its potential to create a
limited form of non-geographical Tiebout sorting. In A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, economist Charles Tiebout famously wrote that
local voters are like consumers who shop for communities that best suit
277
their preferences.
According to the theory, “[m]oving or failing to
move replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and
278
reveals the consumer-voter’s demand for public goods.” As a result,
the provision of public goods by local governments should reflect the
279
preferences of constituents. If this were the case, there would be no
need for an opt-out system or any other gauge of voter preference.
Tiebout, however, relied on a set of highly improbably assumptions,
including assumptions that constituents are fully mobile, have full
knowledge about their choices, and have a large number of
280
heterogeneous communities from which to choose.
These premises
are highly unrealistic, and as Tiebout himself recognized, “[c]onsumervoters do not have perfect knowledge and set preferences, nor are they
281
perfectly mobile.”
Subsequent empirical studies have confirmed that Tiebout’s analogy
282
and assumptions do not hold in real life.
For instance, research has
shown that the presence of multiple jurisdictions is not sufficient to
283
Furthermore, individuals within
ensure competition among them.
at 4–6. I do not seek to challenge this argument; rather, I note that constituents themselves
are in the best position to determine whether these conditions exist.
277. Tiebout, supra note 255, at 418 (1956).
278. Id. at 420.
279. Id. at 416.
280. Id. at 419. One critic has called the assumptions “so patently unrealistic as to verge
on outrageous.” See Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM.
ECON. REV. 93, 93 (1981).
281. See Tiebout, supra note 255, at 423.
282. See Oates, supra note 280, at 94–95 (cataloging empirical work tending to disprove
Tiebout’s assumptions).
283. Id. at 94.
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jurisdictions show too much variation in preferences for local services to
284
support Tiebout’s position. In addition, there seems to be very little
correlation between the amounts paid by taxpayers and goods and
services actually received by them, which suggests that consumers’
shopping behavior is not fully analogous to constituents choosing a
285
locality in which to live.
Indeed, commentators have suggested that
constituents may, instead, be choosing or rejecting one another rather
than the package of goods and services offered by the representative
286
government.
None of this is to say that Tiebout was full of bunk. Clearly, some
people move from one community to another as a result of
dissatisfaction with the level of public goods provided or the level of
taxes charged by the representative government. But it is equally clear
that constituent migration cannot be viewed as an accurate gauge of
constituents’ aggregate preferences. Nonetheless, it may be possible to
allow constituents to behave like consumers through a mechanism other
than full geographic relocation. Local governments’ adoption of an optout system could compensate, in some small regard, for constituents’
lack of mobility, choice, and cross-jurisdictional knowledge.
Constituents presented with an opportunity to either participate or not
while remaining within their current geographic location need not worry
about mobility issues such as continued access to employment and their
preferred peer group. In addition, they need not be concerned with the
fact that their cross-jurisdictional choices may be constrained by
uniformity across local governments. In fact, because constituents’
choices are entirely personal and intra-jurisdictional, they do not need
information about outside jurisdictions to effectively express a
preference. In this way, an opt-out system enables constituents to voice
a preference, as envisioned by Tiebout, but without actually relocating.

284. Id.
285. Id. at 94–95.
286. See id. at 95 (arguing that individuals who comprise a community are just as
important to community outcomes as capital input); Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and
Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 28–29
(2001) (stating that where the quality of locally provided goods, such as public safety and
education, relies upon user input, constituents seek out pools of users whose input will
improve the provision of those goods).
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E. Increased Civic Participation Through Quiet Deliberation
Yet another possible benefit of the opt-out system is its potential to
increase civic participation and to engender a quiet deliberation among
constituents about the role of representative government in the
provision of non-essential public goods.
A rich literature on
deliberative democracy suggests that, if given politically neutral
information and time to discuss it, constituents are willing to consider
that information, including the viewpoints of others, which may lead
287
them to reconsider their entrenched views. The opt-out system may
provide a form of deliberation in which constituents are provided with
information on the views of others, as well as information about the
representative government’s proposed spending.
Although the
discursive format is not as strong as, say, a New England town meeting,
the opt-out system’s provision of information coupled with time for
consideration would allow constituents to make fully informed choices.
Because these choices would not be one-and-done votes, they would
contribute to a running non-verbal exchange on the subject with
potential for creating verbal exchange as well. The result could be a
more thoughtful outcome than would be produced by a simple one-off
vote on a particular spending issue. Furthermore, this novel form of
involvement may increase civic participation in other areas.
Research on increased direct democratic involvement has gained
288
ground in political science over the last decade. Scholars have noted
the potential for participatory models of government to strengthen
relationships between constituents and representative government, to
“build public trust in the government,” and to give the representative
289
government access to new sources of information and ideas.
And
these suggested benefits are not merely speculative; recent empirical
290
studies provide evidence of their existence. For instance, research has
287. For articles elucidating this point, see Hiro N. Aragaki, Deliberative Democracy as
Dispute Resolution? Conflict, Interests, and Reasons, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 407
(2009); and Lawrence Susskind, Deliberative Democracy and Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 395 (2009). See generally Ethan J. Leib, Towards a Practice of
Deliberative Democracy: A Proposal for a Popular Branch, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 359 (2002).
288. For articles elucidating this point, see generally Caroline J. Tolbert et al.,
Enhancing Civic Engagement: The Effect of Direct Democracy on Political Participation and
Knowledge, 3 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 23, 24 (2003) (cataloging arguments regarding direct
democracy’s effect on civic involvement).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 24–27 (providing an overview of several empirical studies on the subject).
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confirmed that the use of direct democracy by states increases their
291
voter turnout, even in unpopular midterm elections.
Research also
confirms “that states with the initiative process have larger and more
292
In
diverse interest group systems than states without the process.”
addition, and perhaps more importantly, a state’s use of initiatives
293
produces “a more politically self-confident and engaged electorate.”
Finally, empirical evidence supports the broader assertion that the use
294
of direct democratic processes strengthens civic engagement overall.
In light of the this evidence, it is not unrealistic to think that the use
of an opt-out system to provide information and funding for certain
non-essential spending could produce similar benefits at the local level,
even if they are smaller in scale and scope. Indeed, experience from
participatory local budgeting processes in Brazilian cities suggests that
295
this might, indeed, be the case. Although the Brazilian processes are
more robust and openly deliberative than the opt-out system, they
nonetheless provide a useful vantage point from which to consider the
potential civic benefits of direct democratic decision-making on matters
of local spending. In at least 103 Brazilian municipalities, constituents
engage in regional meetings to set policy priorities and in neighborhood
meetings to rank these priorities and then select specific projects for
296
funding.
Next, constituents elect delegates to present the results of
their deliberative process, which include a budget proposal, to the city
297
council for its consideration and adoption. Studies of this process have
shown that it develops and sustains non-elite political activism in cities
298
where it is employed. Furthermore, it has curtailed political patronage
and altered the political culture by enabling constituents to make
299
specific requests for public goods. Researchers have found significant
291. Id. at 25, 34.
292. Id. at 26.
293. Id. at 27.
294. Id. at 35.
295. See William R. Nylen, Testing the Empowerment Thesis: The Participatory Budget
in Belo Horizonte and Betim, Brazil, 34 COMP. POL. 127, 127 (2002) (describing participatory
budgeting in Brazil and its effect on civic participation); Brian Wampler & Leonardo
Avritzer, Civil Society and New Institutions in Democratic Brazil, 36 COMP. POL. 291, 291–92,
299 (2004) (same).
296. See Nylen, supra note 295, at 127; Wampler & Avritzer, supra note 295, at 299–300.
297. Nylen, supra note 295, at 127; Wampler & Avritzer, supra note 295, at 300.
298. See Nylen, supra note 295, at 140–41.
299. Wampler & Avritzer, supra note 295, at 305–06.
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spill-over of constituent participation into other social and political
organizations, including notable increases in neighborhood associations
300
and municipal councils.
Finally, although data suggest that
participatory budgeting in Brazil has done little to sustain political
involvement of those who previously showed no interest in politics, it
has provided an effective avenue of participation and lasting ancillary
effects for those constituents who have at least some interest in local
301
political outcomes.
Clearly, the opt-out system is not as deliberative as the Brazilian
process, but it may nonetheless produce similar benefits, even if it does
so to a lesser degree. Like Brazilian participatory budgeting, an opt-out
system allows constituents to voice an opinion on government spending
outside of the representative or initiative processes, even if those
constituents are not particularly politically active or part of the political
elite. In addition, it allows individual constituents to compare their
opinion to those of their peers or to attempt to influence their peers. It
also empowers them, albeit in a lesser way than the Brazilian system, to
exert some control over representative government’s spending
priorities. As a consequence, it may result in stronger civic participation
among constituents, as is suggested by empirical literature on both the
Brazilian process and on direct democratic processes used in the United
States. The combination of evidence from Brazil and from the states
presents a strong case for adoption of an opt-out system at the local
level as a form of beneficial constituent expression—one with the
potential to increase civic participation and the perceived legitimacy of
some local government spending.
F. Challenging a Pernicious Stereotype
In addition to civic buy-in, local governments that adopt an opt-out
system may receive a related benefit: weakening of the anti-tax
American stereotype. The opt-out system, because it would allow us to
openly challenge our ingrained conception of the tax opposition of our
fellow citizens, has the potential to change local communities for the
better while producing positive externalities in the form of better
political discourse and decision-making among constituents at the state
and federal levels.
300. See Nylen, supra note 295, at 133–34.
301. Id. at 140.
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As described in Part II, it is generally accepted that when asked to
contribute to a store of public goods, people will behave cooperatively if
302
they believe that others are doing the same.
Likewise, if people
believe that others are shirking, they will retaliate by withholding
303
cooperation.
Furthermore, when one person cooperates in response
to another, her action may foster the cooperation of a third person, and
304
In light of these research results, the typical depiction of
so on.
Americans—as characteristically opposed to taxation and the provision
of public goods—is especially troubling. If the results described above
are generalizable, a particular constituent may vote against a tax levy or
a spending item not because she is opposed to it, but because she
believes that her neighbor is opposed to it.
I posit that our anti-tax stereotype is sufficiently prevalent to affect
individuals’ views on cooperation, and prevailing research suggests it
contributes to a deleterious result. One need not consult political vitriol
to show that we, as a society, generally accept the premise that we are
against tax and public distribution. Scholars have written that most
people are generally anti-tax and that anti-tax sentiment is “an intrinsic
305
aspect of American patriotism and national character.”
They have
concluded that “tax laws seem capable of engendering nearly universal
anger”; that “[f]or most Americans, any tax is a bad tax”; and that
“perhaps the only thing that truly unites all Americans is a common
306
perception of the Internal Revenue Service . . . as [an] enemy.” With
such sweeping language, it is not difficult to see why constituents may
hold negative views about others’ willingness to cooperate. But if these
statements are true, why do local tax measures sometimes pass? If
Americans are truly and rationally self-interested, why do they donate
to charitable causes? Although there may be a variety of answers to
these questions, it simply cannot be the case that our entire society, or
302. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 78, at 333–34 (describing empirical research on the
subject).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 339.
305. Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 824–26.
306. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and
How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 157–58 (1996). Professor Leo
Martinez has seconded a portion of this sentiment, noting the amount of negative media
coverage and political speech devoted to tax law and referring to the progressive income tax
as “an unpopular foe.” Leo P. Martinez, Tax Legislation and Democratic Discourse: The
Rhetoric of Revenue and Politics, 4 NEV. L.J. 510, 510–12 (2004).
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even a large portion of it, fits within the prevailing anti-tax stereotype.
In localities where the opt-out system succeeded in producing
provision of a public good, constituents would be faced with a challenge
to the anti-tax stereotype and instead would be presented with a positive
model for cooperation. This change in available information may
convince some people to abandon the stereotype for a more nuanced
view of others’ attitudes about tax and spending. Although the
stereotype may persist nationally, information produced locally by an
opt-out production of public goods should be more salient than
information from broader sources because it relates to a constituent
307
reference group.
In addition, the information, which will relate to
designated items of non-essential spending, will be more specific than
media coverage of general anti-tax sentiment. It will relate directly to
the scope of local government and to individual constituents’ willingness
to participate. In that sense, it will be more analogous to experiments
308
demonstrating individuals’ willingness to reciprocally cooperate.
Ideally, this should both increase constituents’ trust in one another and
make them less likely to make assumptions based on the anti-tax
stereotype.
It is reasonable to posit that the cognitive benefit of challenging our
anti-tax stereotype would spill over into other areas of direct democratic
decision-making on taxes and spending. If constituents are willing to
cooperate with others to provide funds for non-essential spending that
they favor, they should also be willing to cooperate with others to
provide funds for essential spending that they favor. In other words,
constituents who work without the hindrance of an anti-tax stereotype
should be more likely to consider tax and spending items on their merits
in light of the willingness of others to do the same. In contrast, those
burdened by the stereotypical perception that all Americans are anti-tax
may refuse to consider tax and spending issues on their merits due to a
misperception about their neighbors’ willingness to cooperate. If this is
true, local governments’ adoption of an opt-out system could have the
potential to change political discourse and decision-making
substantively and for the better.

307. For a discussion of the influence of reference groups, see supra Part II.D and the
accompanying footnotes.
308. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 78, at 333–34 (describing empirical research on the
subject).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Direct democracy, both demonized and lionized, has been a
controversial means of tax and expenditure decision-making since the
309
early 1900s. Scholars have characterized it as a needed political check
on representative government and as an unjust means of implementing
310
tyranny of the majority or of special interests. In fact, this dichotomy
is false; the outcome of direct democratic action need not be one or the
other. The drastic polarization of electoral results, and hence normative
characterizations, may stem from the one time, all-or-nothing nature of
311
existing initiative and referendum processes.
Reimagining these
processes in light of behavioral science’s challenge to classical economic
theories may preserve the efficacy of direct democracy as a political
check on tax and spending while reducing constituents’ tendency to
overreach on specific issues as a means of expressing general
312
dissatisfaction with the representative government.
The opt-out process of decision-making proposed in this Article is
one such reimagining. Rather than function in the all-or-nothing
manner of existing direct democratic voting procedures, an opt-out
system would allow voters to register proportional support over an
extended timeline. Specifically, local representative governments would
choose to submit certain recurring non-capital, non-essential
313
expenditures to proportional decision-making by constituents.
All
constituents would be presumed to support these expenditures unless
they officially refused to pay. Constituents could choose to opt out of
314
payment at any time and for any reason.
Allowing constituents the
option of participating or withdrawing would create an inescapable form
315
of political speech. Although not as consequential as decisions about
essential spending, the ensuing result would provide information to
representative governments about constituents’ perceptions of

309. See generally Persily, supra note 71.
310. See supra Part II.C.
311. See supra Part V.B; Levmore, supra note 11, at 398 (noting that proportional tax
voting allows the process to reach a result that corresponds proportionally to constituent
enthusiasm).
312. See supra Part V.B.
313. See supra Part III.C.
314. See supra Part III.C.
315. See supra Part V.A.

09-HOFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

638

3/20/2012 2:27 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:563

316

governments’ permissible scope and role.
In addition, an opt-out
system would provide individual constituents with an important outlet
for economically meaningful expression, as well as information about
317
others’ preferences. Such a system has the potential to reduce tension
in the constituent–representative government relationship by
simultaneously creating a pressure valve for general constituent
dissatisfaction and a means of constituent–representative government
318
collaboration.
Old economic theories based on the storied rational actor predict
that the opt-out system would fail as both a gauge of political will and as
319
a means of raising revenue. Individuals acting self-interestedly would
320
As a
choose to opt out, free-riding on the contributions of others.
result, the level of funding provided by an opt-out system would be
minimal and would not reflect constituent preference. But prevalence
of the self-interested rational actor has been disproven by behavioral
science. In his place stands a constituent who gauges choices by not only
personal preference, but also by reference to other constituents’ beliefs
321
and actions.
These empirical findings, debunking the myth of the
rational actor’s prevalence, are confirmed by natural experiments on
322
public goods decision-making in both Germany and Brazil.
As a
result, the opt-out process of decision-making by constituents need not
be an academic fairy tale. If structured properly, it could provide a
useful avenue of political expression and an important source of
information for constituents.
As discussed more thoroughly above, providing this additional
means of political expression, which creates new information, could
produce a number of direct and ancillary benefits for local governments.
First, by providing an outlet for general dissatisfaction, an opt-out
323
process may reduce the likelihood of tax revolt. Stated more precisely,
allowing a less drastic means of expression may spur more reasoned,

316. See supra Part V.A.
317. See supra Part V.A.
318. See supra Part V.A.
319. See supra Part II.D.
320. See supra Part II.D.
321. See supra Part II.D.
322. See supra Parts III.A, V.E (discussing the German church tax and public budgeting,
respectively).
323. See supra Part V.B.
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issue-specific voting by constituents on larger issues.
Second,
implementing an opt-out process for the provision of some public goods
would level the playing field for charitable providers by allowing them
to compete for funds otherwise claimed by local government’s taxing
324
power. Third, the opt-out process would create a limited form of nongeographical Tiebout sorting, allowing constituents who are constrained
in their ability to relocate to nonetheless shop for public goods to some
325
extent.
Finally, the opt-out process of decision-making has the
potential to increase civic participation among constituents while
simultaneously replacing a prevalent stereotype—that of the anti-tax
American—with real and relevant information about individual
326
constituents’ peer groups.
If recent behavioral research is
generalizable, constituent access to this information has the potential to
change voting patterns. Instead of voting against any provision of goods
as a result of the perception that other constituents will not cooperate,
327
individuals may instead consider such questions on their merits.
Viewed in this light, the opt-out process is a small change with big
potential—the potential to improve democracy at the local level.

324.
325.
326.
327.

See supra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.D.
See supra Part V.E.
See supra Part V.F.

